Florida International University

FIU Digital Commons
FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations

University Graduate School

6-14-2011

The Impact of Institutional Complexity and Top
Management Characteristics on Executive
Compensation and Firm Performance
Yu-Kai Wang
Florida International University, ywang012@fiu.edu

DOI: 10.25148/etd.FI11072512
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd
Recommended Citation
Wang, Yu-Kai, "The Impact of Institutional Complexity and Top Management Characteristics on Executive Compensation and Firm
Performance" (2011). FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 427.
https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/427

This work is brought to you for free and open access by the University Graduate School at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact dcc@fiu.edu.

FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
Miami, Florida

THE IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITY AND TOP MANAGEMENT
CHARACTERISTICS ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND FIRM
PERFORMANCE

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
by
Yu-Kai Wang
2011

To: Dean Joyce Elam
College of Business Administration
This dissertation, written by Yu-Kai Wang, and entitled The Impact of Institutional
Complexity and Top Management Characteristics on Executive Compensation and Firm
Performance, having been approved in respect to style and intellectual content, is referred
to you for judgment.
We have read this dissertation and recommend that it be approved.
______________________________________
Joyce Elam
______________________________________
Jose de la Torre
______________________________________
William Newburry
______________________________________
Gerry Sanders
______________________________________
Aya Chacar, Major Professor
Date of Defense: June 14, 2011
The dissertation of Yu-Kai Wang is approved.

______________________________________
Dean Joyce Elam
College of Business Administration
______________________________________
Interim Dean Kevin O’Shea
University Graduate School
Florida International University, 2011

ii

DEDICATION
I dedicate this dissertation to my parents, Chieh-Ming Wang and Su-Tseng Su Wang, and
my wife, Victoria Shih. Without their understanding, support, and encouragement, the
completion of this work would not have been possible.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I wish to thank my committee for their support, patience, encouragement, and
professionalism. I am grateful to Dr. Joyce Elam for her guidance on how to balance
between academic theories and their practical applications. I am also indebted to Dr. Jose
de la Torre and Dr. William Newburry for their critical and insightful suggestions. Also I
have benefited greatly from Dr. Gerry Sanders’s deep knowledge on corporate
governance and leadership. Especially, I would like to thank my major professor, Dr. Aya
Chacar, whom I have always looked to for guidance and inspiration. Had she not spent so
much of her time assisting me conquer all kinds of difficulties encountered in my
dissertation, I would not have been where I am.
The completion of the dissertation is the final stage of my doctoral study. During
my doctoral study, I received a lot of support from the entire Department of Management
and International Business. Particularly, I would like express my thankfulness to Dr.
Chris (Changwha) Chung for sharing his experience on data collection and analysis with
me even after he has left the department, as well as to Dr. Galen Kroeck, Chair of the
department, for providing me with an excellent learning environment and necessary
support. I also would like to express my gratitude to Sokol Celo and Yannick Thams,
both of whom are my colleagues, for their comments and suggestions to my dissertation.
Finally, I would like to give thanks to my friends and colleagues, including Armando
Borda, Abdul Beydoun, Abrahim Soleimani, Jiangyun Wan, Kun Yang, Wei He, and
Watcharaphong Leartsuraat, for their great support and company during my doctoral
study.

iv

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
THE IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITY AND TOP MANAGEMENT
CHARACTERISTICS ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND FIRM
PERFORMANCE
by
Yu-Kai Wang
Florida International University, 2011
Miami, Florida
Professor Aya Chacar, Major Professor
While most studies take a dyadic view when examining the environmental
difference between the home country of a multinational enterprise (MNE) and a
particular foreign country, they ignore that an MNE is managing a network of
subsidiaries embedded in diverse environments. Additionally, neither the impacts of
global environments on top executives nor the effects of top executives’ capabilities to
handle institutional complexity are fully explored. Thus, using a three-essay format, this
dissertation tried to fill these gaps by addressing the effects of institutional complexity
and top management characteristics on top executive compensation and firm performance.
Essay 1 investigated the impact of an MNE’s institutional complexity, or the
diversity of national institutions facing an MNE’s network of subsidiaries, on the top
management team (TMT) compensation. This essay proposed that greater political and
cultural complexity leads to not only greater TMT total compensation but also to a
greater portion of TMT compensation linked with long-term performance. The arguments
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are supported in this essay by using an unbalanced panel dataset including 296 U.S. firms
with 1,340 observations.
Essay 2 explored TMT social capital and its moderating role on value creation and
appropriation by the chief executive officer (CEO). Using a sample with 548 U.S. firms
and 2,010 observations, it found that greater TMT social capital does facilitate the effects
of CEO intellectual capital and social capital on firm growth. Finally, essay 3 examined
the performance implications for the fit between managerial information-processing
capabilities and institutional complexity. It proposed that institutional complexity is
associated with the needs of information-processing. On the other hand, smaller TMT
turnover and larger TMT size reflect larger managerial information-processing
capabilities. Consequently, superior performance is achieved by the match among
institutional complexity, TMT turnover, and TMT size. All hypotheses in essay 3 are
supported in a sample of 301 U.S. firms and 1,404 observations.
To conclude, this dissertation advances and extends our knowledge on the roles of
institutional environments and top executives on firm performance and top executive
compensation.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation examines the effects of multinational enterprises’ (MNEs)
institutional complexity and top management characteristics on firm performance and
executive compensation. In the field of strategic management, environments and top
executives are two important antecedents of firm performance and executive
compensation (e.g., Andrews, 1971; Castanias & Helfat, 1991 & 2001; Henderson &
Fredrickson, 1996). In the context of international business, while most studies take a
dyadic view when examining the environmental difference between the home country of
an MNE and a particular foreign country, they ignore that an MNE is managing a
network of subsidiaries in which foreign subsidiaries are embedded in diverse
environments. Additionally, neither the impacts of global environments on top executives
nor the effects of top executives on MNEs’ capabilities to handle international
environmental complexity and performance are fully explored. Consequently, this
dissertation tries to fill these gaps by examining the effects of institutional complexity
and top management characteristics on top executive compensation and firm performance
in three essays.
Essay 1 explored the impact of MNEs’ institutional complexity on top executive
compensation. While much research has examined the antecedents of executive
compensation (see Devers, Cannella, Reilly, & Yoder, 2007 for a comprehensive review),
the impact of MNEs’ context has been under-explored. In addition, past research has
emphasized the impact of managerial capabilities on firm performance (e.g., Carpenter,
Sanders, & Gregersen, 2001; Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997). However, with few
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exceptions (e.g., Carpenter et al., 2001), most studies pay little attention to this impact in
the context of MNEs.
Prior studies proposed that environmental complexity augments the information
processing requirements of top executives, and, hence, will ultimately lead to an increase
in top executive compensation (e.g., Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996; Sanders &
Carpenter, 1998). Empirical results also support this suggestion, demonstrating that
increased internal operational complexity leads to increased top executive compensation
(e.g., Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996) and that increased internationalization has the
same impact on top executive compensation (Sanders & Carpenter, 1998).
Following this line of research, essay 1 expands the examination of environmental
complexity to include international environmental complexity. MNEs operating in
multiple countries face not only internal complexity but also external environmental
complexity (e.g., Verbeke, Li, & Goerzen, 2009). National institutional environments
restrict and constrain resource redeployment within firms and ultimately the choice of
firm strategy and performance (e.g., Chacar & Vissa, 2005; Chacar, Newburry, & Vissa,
2010). These national constraints (North, 1990) make it more difficult for companies to
transfer current competencies and make these existed competencies less relevant
(Kostova, 1999).
Ultimately, operating in diverse national institutional environments augments the
complexity of the managerial task, over and beyond what an increased level of
internationalization may cause (Verbeke et al., 2009). However, the effects of external
environmental complexity, especially MNEs’ institutional complexity, or the diversity of
national institutions, facing MNEs’ network of subsidiaries, have been ignored. Thus, the
2

first essay examines the effect of MNEs’ institutional complexity on top executive
compensation.
Essay 2 examined top management team (TMT) social capital and its moderating
role on value creation and appropriation by the CEO. Prior research has documented the
effects of executives’ intellectual and social capital on the executive compensation (e.g.,
Carpenter et al., 2001; Carpenter & Wade, 2002; Combs & Skill, 2003) and performance
(e.g., Carpenter et al., 2001; Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997).

However, the

relationships between the interactions of managerial capabilities between CEOs and their
TMTs have been neglected.
Thus, essay 2 argued that, on the one hand, the resource-based view of a firm
(Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) and the resource complementarity perspective (Amit &
Schoemaker, 1993) contend that TMT social capital complement CEO intellectual and
social capital, and thus lead to greater performance. On the other hand, drawing from the
rent appropriation theory (Chacar & Coff, 2000; Coff, 1999) and other bargaining power
theories (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Porter, 1980), CEOs’ bargaining power on their
compensation will be weakened. This is because the exercise of CEO intellectual/social
capital is dependent on the extent of TMT social capital.
Essay 3 investigated the impact of MNEs’ institutional complexity, TMT turnover,
and TMT size on firm performance, taking a strategic contingency perspective. While the
relationship between multinationality and performance has been frequently explored, the
results from this research are inconclusive (e.g., Contractor, Kundu, & Hsu, 2003;
Geringer, Beamish, & daCosta, 1989; Lu & Beamish, 2004; Tallman & Li, 1996).
Synthesizing past research, Verbeke et al. (2009) proposed that these studies have been
3

criticized for ignoring the critical elements faced by MNEs. Most notably, prior studies
that investigate the relationship between international diversification and MNE
performance pay little attention to (1) the differentiated international environments faced
by MNEs (Verbeke et al., 2009), as well as (2) the managerial abilities of MNEs
(Geringer et al., 1989). To fill these gaps, this essay examined the impacts of institutional
complexity, TMT turnover, and TMT size on MNE performance taking a strategic
contingency perspective. Essay 3 argued that institutional complexity is associated with
information-processing needs. On the other hand, larger managerial informationprocessing capabilities are achieved by smaller TMT turnover and larger TMT size.
Consequently, the fits among institutional complexity, TMT turnover, and TMT size lead
to superior firm performance.
This dissertation contributes to current research as follows. First, this dissertation
demonstrates that national institutions are key drivers not only of firm performance and
strategic actions (e.g Chacar & Vissa, 2005; Chacar et al, 2010; Henisz, 2000) but also of
top executive compensation. Second, this dissertation will contribute to the theory on top
executives by showing that TMT social capital can complement CEO intellectual/social
capital (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Krishnan, Miller, & Judge, 1997). Finally, this
dissertation applies the strategic contingency perspective to explore the match between
information-processing needs and information-processing capabilities in the context of
MNEs and once again to show the importance of tailoring internal components with
external environments (Prescott, 1986; Vissa & Chacar, 2009).
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II. MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE’S INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITY
AND TOP MANAGEMENT TEAM’S COMPENSATION
INTRODUCTION
International business research has been increasingly focused on the importance of
national institutions and their impact on strategic decision making and firm performance
(e.g., Chacar & Vissa, 2005; Chacar, Newburry, & Vissa, 2010; Delio & Henisz, 2003;
Henisz, 2000; Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Mudambi & Navarra, 2002). In
addition, as firms internationalize, executives have to deal with multiple national
environments, increasing the complexity of the managerial task (e.g., Birkinshaw, Toulan,
& Arnold, 2001; Ghoshal, Korine, & Szulanski, 1994; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998).
Consequently, one would expect the compensation of top executives to increase with the
increased level of international institutional complexity that they need to manage.
Surprisingly, we know little about this issue, although past research has documented that
managerial information-processing demand is positively associated with top executive
compensation (e.g. Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998).
In this study, we argue that international institutional complexity, or managing
subsidiaries embedded in heterogeneous national institutional environments, is an
important consideration in executive compensation decisions. In line with past research
(Kostova, 1999), we propose that when faced with similar national institutions,
executives can more readily deploy competencies already developed, but when disparities
between home and host country institutions are larger, greater information processing
will be needed, which in turn should lead to greater compensation (e.g. Daft & Lengel,
1986; Thompson, 1967; Tushman & Nadler, 1978). We hence propose that firms with
8

greater international institutional complexity will need to compensate to a greater degree
their executives. Built on past literature, we propose that both the formal and the informal
institutional environments (North, 1990) are the key elements of institutional complexity.
Among the elements of formal and informal institutions, political and cultural institutions
are most salient and likely to influence executive compensation respectively (Henisz,
2000; Kogut & Singh, 1988). Accordingly, top executives’ compensation will need to
reflect the higher information-processing demands associated with disparities among the
host countries of a multinational enterprise (MNE) in terms of political institutions and
culture (Tushman & Nadler, 1978). Our empirical tests, based on compensation of top
executives in 296 U.S. firms with 1,340 observations from 2002 to 2009 indeed show that
greater dispersion in national institutional environments facing the MNE subsidiary
network leads to greater compensation of MNE executives.
In the following sections, we first discuss theoretically the relationship between
MNE’s institutional complexity and executive compensation, based on the informationprocessing perspective and dispersion of national institutions within an MNE network.
We then propose that such MNE’s institutional complexity will lead to increased
compensation of top management team (TMT) compensation and its long-term
proportion. Next, we describe our empirical methodology and present the main results.
Finally, we discuss the contributions of this study and make suggestions for future
research.
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INFORMATION-PROCESSING REQUIREMENTS AND EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION
Information processing plays a critical role in executives’ duties. Top executives
must scan and monitor external environments, examine internal resources, collect data and
analyze it, and then make strategic choices (Andrews, 1971). In all of these tasks,
executives must process large amounts of information before making the decisions
(Mintzberg, 1973; Ungson, Braunstein, & Hall, 1981). Since information processing
constitutes a major part of executives’ duties, their compensation should be related to
information-processing requirements in their firm (e.g., Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996).
Indeed, prior research has proposed that the greater the information-processing
requirements on top executives, the greater their compensation will be. For example,
Henderson and Fredrickson (1996) proposed that managing greater amounts of R&D and
capital investment activities makes organizations more complex. Greater investments in
R&D activities are associated with developing more advanced technologies or greater
scales of R&D projects, which in turn increase technological uncertainty. Ultimately,
larger scales of R&D projects may require a greater diversity of inputs and a higher extent
of coordination. All of these request a greater level of information-processing requirements
and ultimately top executive compensation (Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996). There is
also evidence that increased scope, be it horizontal, vertical, or international also affects
compensation. For example, Henderson and Fredrickson (1996) proposed that when a firm
becomes more diversified, top executives are required to process a greater amount of
information (Chandler, 1962; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986), leading to greater top executive
compensation. This is driven by the need for executives to handle more non-routine
10

strategic decisions in a firm with a broader business unit portfolio (Thompson, 1967).
These non-routine strategic decisions may be associated with not only the related
diversification that increases the need of interdependence among subunits (e.g. Jones &
Hill, 1988) but also the unrelated diversification that enhances the challenge of allocating
internal capital efficiently (Jones & Hill, 1988). Henderson and Fredrickson (1996) also
proposed that vertically integrated firms have greater capital investment activities and
require more coordination of upstream and downstream activities. Thus these firms will
necessitate greater information-processing and ultimately greater compensation levels.
Focusing on international scope, Sanders and Carpenter (1998) proposed that a
greater international diversification means that the headquarters of an MNE need to manage
a larger portfolio of foreign subsidiaries. In other words, the dyadic linkages between the
MNE and its subsidiaries increase. For the top executives at the headquarters of the MNE,
this means processing greater extents of information (Contractor, Kundu, & Hsu, 2003;
Geringer, Beamish, & daCosta, 1989). In addition to the increase of dyadic linkages, a
greater international diversification also increases the demands for coordinating or
managing the interactions among subsidiaries (e.g., Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990). In fact, as
Sanders and Carpenter’s (1998) study demonstrated, the extent of international
diversification is positively related to CEO total compensation.
MNES AND INFORMATION-PROCESSING REQUIREMENTS

MNEs are often described as highly complex organizations (Ghoshal & Nohria,
1989). This complexity, in turn, creates high information-processing requirements on
executives managing these MNEs (Egelhoff, 1991). In that vein, a large stream of literature
on MNEs has argued that large internal information-processing requirements play an
11

important role in determining the choice of MNE structure. For example, portraying an
MNE as an information-processing system, Egelhoff (1982) proposed that MNE structure
is determined by its strategy. The underlying logic of the relationship is that the chosen
strategy determines the information-processing requirements between the MNE and its
foreign subsidiaries or among subsidiaries.

From this internal information-processing

viewpoint, Wolf and Egelhoff (2002), focusing on internal information-processing
requirements, further posited that foreign R&D activities are positively associated with an
MNE’s structure based on a geographic region or worldwide function division.
Information-processing requirements, however, not only originate from the internal
networking of an MNE and its chosen strategy, but also are affected by external
institutional environments. Indeed, another strand of the international business literature on
foreign direct investments, international diversification, and entry has emphasized the
critical role of external environmental complexity. For example, Hymer (1976) highlighted
the impact of the environmental differences between home and host countries on the
success of MNEs. He argued that MNEs that enter into and operate within foreign countries
face costs of doing business abroad, because these foreign countries have different
environments such as governmental regulations, social norms, and customer tastes. Thus,
Hymer argued that in order to enter and operate in foreign countries, MNEs need to possess
ownership advantages, such as superior technological capabilities, to overcome these
disadvantages, compared with indigenous firms in the host countries.

Zaheer (1995)

expanded on the work of Hymer’s, terming the costs of doing business abroad the “liability
of foreignness”.

12

Similarly, in the theory of internationalization process (Johnanson & Vahlne, 1977 &
1990) external environments are perceived as complex, albeit varyingly, so international
environmental complexity is viewed as adding to the information-processing requirements
of an MNE. The theory of internationalization process considers international environments
as a critical foundation. This theory argues that in the early stages, an MNE may enter
foreign markets that are closer to home or less complex to understand. These are the
countries with the smallest psychic distance from the home country and in which
environments are easier to learn and understand.

As MNEs learn and accumulate

international experience, MNEs may enter foreign markets with larger psychic distance.
Hence, the process of a firm’s internationalization would be incremental.
Among the international environmental factors, the effects of national institutions on
the operations of MNEs have been emphasized (e.g. Kostova & Roth, 2002). Because
these national institutions differ among countries (Kostova, 1999), institutional distance
between home and host countries matters for MNEs. For instance, drawing on institutional
theory, Kostova (1999) proposed that the transfer of organizational practices from an MNE
to its subsidiaries is affected by differences in regulatory, cognitive, and normative
components of national institutions. Kostova and Roth (2002) also found that subsidiaries’
adoptions of their practices are determined by national institutions in the host countries.
National institutions affect not only the internal operations of subsidiaries of MNEs but also
their relationships with external environments. For example, Kostova and Zaheer (1999)
demonstrated how MNEs’ legitimacy in host countries is hampered by institutional
complexities.

13

MNE INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITY AND TMT COMPENSATION
While the executive compensation literature has focused primarily on internal
environmental complexity (Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998),
we emphasize in this study the importance of external environmental complexity, which
is driven by managing subsidiaries in various national institutions, or MNE’s institutional
complexity. Firm behavior and performance are shaped and constrained by both formal
and informal national institutions (North, 1990; Kostova & Roth, 2002). Thus, apart
from industry structural attributes and firm-specific characteristics, firm strategies and
hence information-processing requirements likely also depend on national institutional
factors (e.g., Chacar & Vissa, 2005).
Institutions are humanly developed constraints that shape human interaction and
are akin to the ‘rules of the game’ (North, 1990). An economy’s institutional context is a
combination of formal rules, informal constraints, and their enforcement characteristics.
With institutional change usually being gradual and path dependent, institutional contexts
vary significantly across countries, and even neighboring countries or countries of
otherwise similar characteristics can have wildly different national institutions (North,
1990; Kostova, 1999).

Institutions impact firm strategic choices, operations and/or

governance structures (e.g., Leff, 1978; Murtha & Lenway, 1994) and industry structure
(Caves, 1986). Ultimately, different institutions require different strategic responses from
firms (Oliver, 1991) and hence greater information processing on the part of executives
managing MNEs. In that vein, for instance, Delios and Henisz (2003) demonstrated that
experience in dealing with political hazards decreases the sensitivity of firms towards
such hazards when making entry decisions.
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Overall, the previous evidence suggests that national institutions impact firm
strategic choices, operations and/or governance structures. The more different national
institutions in host countries from those in the home country, the more complex it is to
operate an MNE and design strategies for its success. In turn, this impacts informationprocessing requirements and ultimately top executive compensation. We hence propose
in this study that MNE’s institutional complexity derived from managing subsidiaries in
diverse national institutions is positively associated with TMT total compensation and the
proportion of TMT long-term compensation.

In the proposed model, TMT total

compensation and the proportion of TMT long-term compensation are driven by two key
components of MNE’s institutional complexity: political and cultural.

Political and

cultural institutions are employed to represent national institutions, because these two
dimensions have been well documented for their impacts on MNEs strategic making
(Henisz, 2000; Meyer, Mudambi, & Narula, 2011; Schwens, Eiche, Kabst, 2011).
MNE’s Political Complexity and TMT Total Compensation
When MNEs conduct economic activities in foreign countries, they cannot escape
the constraints of political environments in host countries (Boddewyn, 1988). Based on the
transaction cost arguments (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975), political instability can be a
proxy for external uncertainty, and thus affect the decision of the choice of entry mode (e.g.
Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Contractor & Kundu, 1998). In addition, the entry mode is
also determined by political distance between home and host countries (e.g. Erramilli,
1991). This line of research argues that resource commitment in the host countries is
affected by local political factors. Thus, top executives of MNEs are required to assess
political risk in host countries (Simon, 1984).
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While MNEs can develop skills and routines in dealing with a particular political
environment, such as choosing a joint venture rather than a wholly owned subsidiary or
engaging in political actions, these skills are highly idiosyncratic and hard to transfer to
other countries which are very different in terms of their political profile. Thus, this study
expects that managing diverse political distances from their home countries increases
information-processing requirements for TMT.

The higher extents of information-

processing requirements lead to a higher extent of TMT total compensation level
(Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). Therefore, this study
argues:
Hypothesis 1: The greater extent of a firm’s political complexity that the TMT of
the firm faces, the greater the TMT total compensation.
MNE’s Cultural Complexity and TMT Total Compensation
National culture is concerned with societal value systems of a country (Hofstede,
1984; House, 2004). MNEs operating in multiple countries face various societal values.
As a consequence, cultural distances between home and host countries become an issue,
influencing strategic decisions and performance of MNEs. For example, at the team level,
Von Glinow, Shapiro, and Brett (2004) emphasized that managing emotional conflict is an
important issue in multicultural teams.
Differences in national cultures result in different organizational and administrative
practices (Kogut & Singh, 1988), which make the transfer of those practices and the
associated acculturation more challenging. From an organizational learning perspective,
when expanding to regions close to their knowledge base of foreign cultures, companies
improve and refine their existing knowledge (Barkema & Drogendijk, 2007) leading to
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semi-automatic reproduction of their existing routines (Zollo & Winter, 2002; Ahuja &
Lampert, 2001), and to the application of existing concepts as well as objects and the
linkages between them, rather than to the development of new ones (Cohen & Levinthal,
1990). In fact, greater cultural distances within the MNE have been linked to lower
performance (e.g., Gomez-Mejia & Palich, 1997).
Since greater cultural distances may lead to poor understanding of host countries, top
executives managing subsidiaries located in greater cultural distance areas from their home
countries are unable to transfer established routines and may suffer from a greater extent of
uncertainty (Shane, Venkataraman, & Macmillan, 1995). This higher uncertainty demands
greater information processing (Tushman & Nadler, 1978).
We expect that a variety of these cultural distances from their home countries
increases information-processing demands for TMTs, because it requires TMTs to manage
different cultural environments simultaneously and thus adds to task complexity for TMTs
(Tushman & Nadler, 1978). In other words, although the accumulation of knowledge or
path dependence may function (Nelson & Winter, 1982) and reduce uncertainty, it may not
apply to decision making under different cultural contexts. In this case, strategic decisions
made for a subsidiary may not apply to other subsidiaries, so higher extents of non-routine
decision-making demand a greater amount of information-processing. Since greater cultural
distance may lead to greater information-processing demands and thus to greater TMT
compensation, the focus of this study is the effects of cultural complexity deriving from
managing subsidiaries in diverse cultural environments. Therefore:
Hypothesis 2: The greater extent of a firm’s cultural complexity that the TMT of the
firm faces, the greater the TMT total compensation.
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MNE’s Institutional Complexity and the proportion of TMT long-term
compensation
MNE’s institutional complexity not only demands a greater extent of informationprocessing needs for top executives but also creates difficulties for the boards of directors
to effectively exercise their monitoring function (Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). Since the
interests of TMT are not always aligned with those of shareholders, top executives may
prioritize their personal interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989).
Particularly, when firms face greater institutional complexity, information asymmetries
between top executives and their boards of directors may be greater. Consequently, these
top executives may have more room to seek their personal interests rather than
maximizing the wealth of shareholders and their boards may face more challenges on
limiting these top executive self-interest seeking behaviors (Mace, 1971).
In addition to the monitoring role of boards of directors, the executive incentive
alignment mechanism has been widely proposed to solve the issues of divergent goals
between top executives and their shareholders (Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Zajac & Westphal,
1994). While there are various ways to compensate top executives, they can be categorized
as two types: short-term, such as cash, and long-term contingent compensation. The longterm compensation plays the role of a remedy to direct the interests of top executives
toward those of shareholders, because the rewards of top executives will rely on the
increase of shareholders’ wealth. Therefore, prior research has documented that long-term
pay mix of top executives affects the strategic choices of top executives (e.g., Datta,
Musteen, & Herrmann, 2009).
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Since top executive incentive alignment and board monitoring are two critical
mechanisms to assure that the strategic behaviors of top executives are for the benefits of
their shareholders, they can substitute each other (Zajac & Westphal, 1994). In other words,
in the situation that the board’s monitoring cannot function effectively due to institutional
complex environments, a greater proportion of long-term compensation should be used to
direct strategic behaviors of top executives towards interests of shareholders. As such, one
would expect that not only political complexity but also cultural complexity are associated
with a greater proportion of TMT long-term compensation. Thus, this study proposes:
Hypothesis 3: The greater extent of a firm’s political complexity that a TMT faces,
the greater the proportion of TMT long-term compensation.
Hypothesis 4: The greater extent of a firm’s cultural complexity that a TMT faces,
the greater the proportion of TMT long-term compensation.
METHODS
The data of our sample are derived from multiple archival data sources from 2002
to 2009. We lagged the data of the independent and control variables by one year in
order to avoid the reverse causality issue. Therefore, our data on independent and control
variables are from 2001 to 2008. We obtained data from the following sources: (a) the
TMT compensation data were obtained from the Compustat ExecuComp database; (b) the
subsidiaries information were from the Directory of Corporate Affiliations (DCA)
database; (c) the board characteristic data were from the Corporate Library database; (d)
industry- and firm-level financial data were drawn from the Compustat database; and (e)
the sources of institutional complexity data were acquired from Henisz’s Political
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Constraint Index (POLCON) dataset for political institutions as well as Global Project for
national cultural institutions.
The final sample contained information on 296 U.S. based MNEs with 1,340
observations obtained by merging several different databases and datasets to obtain all the
measures needed for the study, and dropping the observations with missing values.
Our initial sample is from the DCA. Since our sample needs to access data from
multiple sources, we used ticker symbols as the identifiers. Then, we identified 6,911
observations on 1,836 public firms which contain the ticker symbols in the DCA from
2001 to 2008. Since institutional complexity is the research focus, this study contains
firms with foreign subsidiaries operating in three or more foreign countries in the sample.
Consequently, 3,752 observations were dropped due to this criterion. Additionally, 196
firms with one year observations in the DCA were dropped, because these observations
cannot reflect unobservable time variation. Subsequently, 2,963 observations on 635
firms were remained.

Finally, after merging data from other sources and dropping

observations with missing values, our final sample is an unbalanced panel data set which
contains 296 firms and 1,340 observations.
Statistical Model
Since a panel data set was used, we employed fixed-effects regression models to
test the hypotheses we proposed. For analyzing a panel data set, either fixed-effects
regression models or random-effects regression models could be applied. However, the
Hausman specification test indicated that the fixed-effects regression models were more
suitable to this study compared with the random-effects regression models. Therefore, the
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fixed-effects regression models were selected. Additionally, predictors entered into the
regression models after standardized.
Variables
Below the definition and operationalization of variables is introduced. The
summary of variable definition and data sources is in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 Variable Definition and Data Sources for Essay 1
Variable

Description

TMT total compensation

𝑙𝑛 ∑(𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 + 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠 + 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 − 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛 +
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)/𝑛 ; n: the number of top executives in
an MNE
∑(𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 −
𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛)/𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 1/𝑛 ∗ 100; n:
the number of top executives in an MNE
Political complexity = coefficient of variation on the
POLCON distance (pccv);

TMT long-term
compensation mix
Political complexity

Source
1

1
2

Calculation steps:
Step 1: Calculation for 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 =
𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑗 − 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑢𝑠 ); j: a host country which a
foreign subsidiary of an MNE located

Cultural complexity

Step 2: pccv = (sd of 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 / mean of
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 )
Cultural complexity = coefficient of variation on the GLOBAL
PROJECT’s cultural distance (cccv);

3

Calculation steps:
Step 1: Calculation for 𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 = ∑9𝑖=1(𝐼𝑖𝑗 −
𝐼𝑖𝑢𝑠 )2 /𝑉𝑖 ) ∗ 1/9; j: a host country; i: a dimension of culture; V:
variance of a cultural dimension; This measure is similar to
Kogut and Singh’s (1988) indicator of cultural distance

Industry performance

TMT size
Firm size
Firm performance
CEO duality

Step 2: cccv = (sd of 𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 / mean of
𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 )
Industry ROA =
∑𝑛𝑖�𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒�𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 � ∗ 1/𝑛 *100
n: the total number of firms with the same three-digits SIC
codes excluding the focal firm
A count of the total number of top officers in an MNE
The total assets of an MNE
ROA = net income/total assets *100
Dummy =1 if a CEO is also the chairperson and 0 otherwise
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4

1
4
4
5

The number of outside directors/the number of total
5
directors*100
R&D intensity
R&D spending/total sales * 100
4
Product diversification
Chatterjee and Wernerfelt’s measure
6
Product diversification = ∑𝑗 𝑑𝑖ℎ 𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑑𝑖ℎ : it is a distance of a business segment to the largest
business segment of an MNE based on SIC code; 0 if they
have the same four-digit SIC codes; 1 if they have the same
three-digit SIC code, and etc.
𝑝𝑖𝑗 : sales in the j business segment/total sales
International diversification The number of host countries which an MNE has subsidiaries
7
located.
Note: 1. Compustat ExecuComp database; 2. Henisz’s Political Constraint Index (POLCON) dataset; 3.
House’s Global Project; 4. Compustat database; 5. Corporate Library database; 6. Compustat Segment
database; 7. Directory of Corporate Affiliations database
Outside director ratio

Dependent Variables
The dependent variables are the average TMT total compensation and average TMT
long-term compensation mix. The total compensation was the natural logarithm of the sum
of all kinds of compensation, including salary, bonus, stock option, and others, that top
executives received in a given year (e.g. Carpenter, Sanders, & Gregersen, 2001; Sanders &
Carpenter, 1998). Additionally, TMT long-term compensation ratio was calculated as
long-term compensation, including stock options, restricted stock, and long-term incentive
plans, over total compensation (Sanders & Carpenter, 1998).
Independent Variables
Firm’s political complexity.

This study used Henisz’s political constraints

(POLCON) to measure a nation’s political institutions. The POLCON indicator reflects the
extent to which the choice of public policy is constrained by the structure of political
institutions (Henisz, 2000). This indicator has been widely used by past research (Delios &
Henisz, 2003; Henisz, 2000). Each political distance was measured by the absolute value
of the difference between the U.S.’s and a host country’s scores on the POLCON indicator.
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Then, MNE’s political complexity was measured by the coefficient of variation, which is
commonly used for measuring the dispersion of a continuous variable. It was calculated as
the ratio between standard deviation and the mean of all political distances between an
MNE and its foreign subsidiaries.
Firm’s cultural complexity.

In this study, we used House, Hanges, Javidan,

Dorfman, and Gupta’s (2004) the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior
Effectiveness (GLOBE) project to measure a nation’s culture.

The nine cultural

dimensions of GLOBE project are: assertiveness, institutional collectivism, in-group
collectivism, future orientation, gender egalitarianism, humane orientation, performance
orientation, power distance, and uncertainty avoidance.

Each cultural distance was

measured by the absolute value of the difference between the U.S.’s and a host country’s
scores. Since a national culture contains multiple dimensions, Kogut and Singh (1988)
developed a formula to reflect the overall cultural distance between two countries. This
formula has been widely used by prior research (e.g., Morosini, Shane, Singh, 1998; Roth
& O’Donnell, 1996). Consequently, we adopted Kogut and Singh’s (1988) formula to
measure national cultural distances for the U.S. and all host countries of an MNE. This
formula generates a composite index of the GLOBE project’s nine national cultural
dimensions. Then, cultural complexity was measured by the coefficient of variation of
MNE’s cultural distances.
Control Variables
Nine variables are controlled by this study. They are: (1) industry performance, (2)
TMT size, (3) firm size, (4) firm performance, (5) CEO duality, (6) outside director ratio,
(7) R&D intensity, (8) product diversification, and (9) international diversification.
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Industry performance. Industry performance here reflects generally profitability of
a firm’s competitors in a particular industry.

Average industry ROA which is the

percentage of the industry net income over industry total assets is used to measure industry
performance. The data on an industry are based on firms with the same three-digit standard
industrial classification (SIC) code but exclude the focal firms.
TMT size. A greater number of TMT members may reflect managerial information
processing as a whole. TMT size was measured by a count of the total number of top
officers in an MNE (e.g. O’Reilly, Main, & Crystal, 1988; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998).
Firm size. Firm size is widely accepted to influence the executive compensation. In
Tosi, Werner, Katz, and Gomez-Mejia’s (2000) research, for example, they found that firm
size explains about 40% of the variance of top executive compensation. Thus, firm size
measured as total assets of a firm is controlled by this study.
Firm Performance. Firm performance is frequently proposed to determine the
executive compensation. For example, Tosi et al. (2000) found that firm performance
explains around 5% of the variance of top executive compensation. Firm performance was
operationalized as return on asset (ROA). ROA is the percentage of the net income over
total assets.
CEO duality.

CEO power is an important concept in corporate governance

(Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Zajac & Westphal, 1996), particularly in top executive
compensation (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989). Thus, this study employed CEO duality,
CEO with chairperson status. In other words, the CEO holds both CEO and chairperson
positions. This variable is a dummy variable. When a CEO is also the chairperson, the
value of 1 was coded. Otherwise, the value of 0 was assigned.
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Outside director ratio. Board vigilance is widely proposed to affect the executive
compensation (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989) based on agency theory (Jensen & Meckling,
1976). Thus, this study employed outside director ratio to reflect the extent of board
vigilance. The outside director ratio was measured by the percentage of the number of
outside directors over the total number of directors.
R&D intensity. R&D intensity can be a dimension of the complexity of a firm
(Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996), and thus they were controlled by this study. This study
measured R&D intensity by the ratio of R&D spending over total sales.
Product diversification. The relatedness of business segments of a firm can reflect
the extent of needs for information-processing demands (Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996).
Therefore, product diversification was controlled for by this study with product
diversification measured using Chatterjee and Wernerfelt’s entropy measure (1991).
International diversification. International diversification reflects the presence of
foreign operations in an MNE’s portfolio, and additional information-processing demands
(Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). It is measured by the number of foreign countries in which
the firms have subsidiaries located. The measure of international diversification is in line
with prior research (e.g. Geringer et al. 1989).
RESULTS
Table 2.2 presents means, standard deviations, and correlations for all variables.
We report results of fixed-effects linear regression analyses for TMT total compensation
and TMT long-term compensation ratio in Tables 2.3 and 2.4, respectively. In Table 2.3,
model 1 is the baseline model where only control variables are included. The model is
significant (F = 2.77, p <.01) and several of the control variables are significant. In the
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baseline model, as hypothesized in past research, we predicted that firm size, firm
performance, CEO duality, R&D intensity, production diversification, and international
diversification would be positively associated with the TMT total compensation. We
found that the coefficients of firm size (b = .295, p <.01) as well as CEO duality (b = .072,
p <.10) fit our predictions. However, the coefficients of firm performance (b = .021, p
>.10), R&D intensity (b = -.004, p >.10), product diversification (b = -.036, p >.10), and
international diversification (b = -.032, p >.10) are insignificant, although the p-value of
firm performance is .176 which is close to the significant level of .10.
In line with past research, we predicted that industry performance, TMT size, as
well as outside director ratio would be negatively associated with the TMT total
compensation. The coefficient of industry performance is b = -.024 (p <.10). We also
found that the coefficient of TMT size (b = -.039, p <.05) fits our prediction but not
outside director ratio (b = -.009, p >.10).
Models 2 and 3 add each of the MNE’s institutional complexity measures, namely
politic and cultural complexity, respectively. Model 4 presents the full model. All of
these models are significant (F = 2.95, p <.01; F = 2.88, p <.01; F = 3.02, p <.001).
Hypotheses 1 and 2 propose the MNE’s institutional complexity will affect the TMT total
compensation. Hypothesis 1 argues that the greater the MNE’s political complexity a
TMT facing, the greater the TMT total compensation. This hypothesis is supported in
both Model 2 (b = .057, p <.05) and the full Model (b = .057, p <.05). Hypothesis 2
posits that MNE’s cultural complexity will be positively associated with the TMT total
compensation. The coefficients for MNE’s cultural complexity are significant in Model 3
(b = .075, p <.10) and Model 6 (b = .074, p <.10). Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is supported.
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Table 2.2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Essay 1

20.4

0.72

1.00

1.0

0.4

0.11

0.09

1.00

0.6

0.2

0.06

0.04

-0.03

1.00

4.2

6.4

0.07

0.08

0.04

-0.02

1.00

5.9

1.2

0.06

-0.06

0.03

0.02

-0.15

1.00

15.4

100.6

0.22

0.07

0.02

0.01

-0.02

0.13

1.00

4.9

13.8

0.15

0.12

0.09

0.07

0.23

-0.18

-0.01

1.00

0.6

0.5

0.12

0.00

0.02

0.01

0.01

-0.04

0.03

0.05

1.00

83.1

9.0

0.16

0.22

0.04

0.00

0.08

-0.04

0.00

0.07

0.10

1.00

8.0

9.0

0.04

0.10

-0.09

-0.12

-0.02

0.04

-0.06

-0.21

-0.10

-0.05

1.00

Product
0.4
0.6
0.18
0.09
0.06
0.05 -0.01
0.03
0.06
diversification
International
11.6
10.8
0.39
0.25
0.23 -0.11
0.10
0.06
0.09
13
diversification
N=1340; All correlations larger than .06 in absolute value are significant at the p=.05 level.

-0.01

0.19

0.10

-0.26

1.00

0.11

0.11

0.14

0.08

0.19

5
6

TMT size

7

Firm size

8

Firm
performance

9

CEO duality

10

Outside director
ratio

11

R&D intensity

12
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7

12

61.1

4

6

11

2

3

5

10

1
1.00

2

4

9

SD
0.8

1

3

8

Mean
7.7

TMT total
compensation
TMT long-term
compensation
ratio
Political
complexity
Cultural
complexity
Industry
performance

13

1.00

Table 2.3 Results of Fixed-effects Linear Regression Analyses for TMT Total
Compensation
Model 1
Political complexity

Model 2
0.057*
[0.027]

Cultural complexity
Industry performance
TMT size
Firm size
Firm performance
CEO duality
Outside director ratio
R&D intensity
Product
diversification
International
diversification
Constant

-0.024†
[0.014]
-0.039*
[0.015]
0.295**
[0.101]
0.021
[0.015]
0.072†
[0.039]
-0.009
[0.021]
-0.004
[0.033]
-0.036
[0.037]
-0.032
[0.045]
7.624***
[0.026]
296
1340
2.77**

-0.027†
[0.014]
-0.039*
[0.015]
0.283**
[0.101]
0.019
[0.015]
0.075†
[0.039]
-0.008
[0.021]
-0.003
[0.033]
-0.036
[0.037]
-0.043
[0.045]
7.622***
[0.026]
296
1340
2.95**

Model 3
0.075†
[0.039]
-0.025†
[0.014]
-0.039*
[0.015]
0.297**
[0.101]
0.023
[0.015]
0.069†
[0.039]
-0.008
[0.021]
-0.001
[0.033]
-0.032
[0.037]
-0.018
[0.046]
7.625***
[0.026]
296
1340
2.88**

No. of firms
No. of observations
F value
Notes:
1. S.E. in square brackets.
2. *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.10; t test are all two-tailed tests.
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Model 4
0.057*
[0.027]
0.074†
[0.039]
-0.028*
[0.014]
-0.039*
[0.015]
0.286**
[0.101]
0.022
[0.015]
0.073†
[0.039]
-0.008
[0.021]
-0.001
[0.033]
-0.033
[0.037]
-0.029
[0.046]
7.623***
[0.026]
296
1340
3.02***

Table 2.4 reports the results of fixed-effects linear regression analyses for TMT
long-term compensation ratio. Model 5, the baseline model, only includes control
variables. The model is significant (F = 6.74, p <.001) as well as three control variables
are significant. They are TMT size (b = -3.169, p <.001), firm size (b = 13.501, p <.01),
as well as CEO duality (b = -2.615, p <.10) which are all fit our predictions. Although
the coefficients of firm performance (b = .843, p >.10) and outside director ratio (b =
1.168, p >.10) are insignificant, their p-values, .151 and .146, are very close to the
significant level of .10.
Then, from model 6 and 7, two dimensions of MNE’s institutional complexity
were added separately. Model 8 is the full model. Again all of the models are significant
(p <.001). Hypothesis 3 and 4 posits that the MNE’s institutional complexity will affect
the average TMT long-term compensation ratio. Hypothesis 3 proposes that the MNE’s
political complexity is positively associated with the average TMT long-term
compensation ratio. The results show that b = 3.745 and p <.001 in model 6 and b =
3.723 and p <.001 in model 8. Therefore, hypothesis 3 is supported. Hypothesis 4
proposes that MNE’s cultural complexity will be positively related to the average TMT
long-term compensation ratio.

The coefficient for MNE’s cultural complexity is

significant in Model 7 (b = 3.574, p <.05) as well as the full model (b = 3.526, p <.05), so
hypothesis 4 also receives a support.
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Table 2.4 Results of fixed-effects linear regression analyses for TMT long-term
compensation ratio
Model 5
Political complexity

Model 6
3.745***
[1.047]

Cultural complexity
Industry performance
TMT size
Firm size
Firm performance
CEO duality
Outside director ratio
R&D intensity
Product
diversification
International
diversification
Constant

-0.271
[0.536]
-3.169***
[0.585]
13.501**
[3.902]
0.843
[0.587]
-2.615†
[1.518]
1.168
[0.802]
-0.191
[1.276]
-1.555
[1.437]
-0.095
[1.756]
62.736***
[1.027]
296
1340
6.74***

-0.435
[0.535]
-3.169***
[0.582]
12.721**
[3.886]
0.761
[0.584]
-2.405
[1.511]
1.183
[0.798]
-0.151
[1.269]
-1.581
[1.429]
-0.776
[1.756]
62.605***
[1.022]
296
1340
7.41***

Model 7
3.574*
[1.500]
-0.316
[0.535]
-3.159***
[0.584]
13.609***
[3.894]
0.976
[0.588]
-2.717†
[1.515]
1.194
[0.801]
-0.078
[1.274]
-1.399
[1.435]
0.573
[1.774]
62.799***
[1.025]
296
1340
6.66***

No. of firms
No. of observations
F value
Notes:
1. S.E. in square brackets.
2. *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.10; t test are all two-tailed tests.
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Model 8
3.723***
[1.045]
3.526*
[1.491]
-0.479
[0.534]
-3.159***
[0.581]
12.832**
[3.878]
0.894
[0.585]
-2.507†
[1.508]
1.208
[0.796]
-0.040
[1.267]
-1.426
[1.427]
-0.113
[1.775]
62.668***
[1.020]
296
1340
7.27***

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In this study, we propose that MNE’s institutional complexity is yet another
dimension of complexity that faces top executives, increasing the demands on their
information-processing capabilities. In line with past research (Henderson & Fredrickson,
1996; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998), we propose that such complexity will then lead to
additional compensation. Additionally, institutional complexity creates an environment
which board monitoring may not be able to function effectively, and long-term
performance compensation should be emphasized. Our results show strong support for
the theory presented. We find that both greater MNE’s political and cultural complexity
can lead to greater the average TMT total compensation as well as the proportion of longterm compensation.
The contributions of this study have the following three aspects. First, these
findings demonstrate one more time that national institutions are essential elements in
MNEs strategic decisions, such as the choice of entry mode (e.g., Contractor & Kundu,
1998) or organizational practice transfer (e.g., Kostova, 1999), and ultimately impacting
MNE performance (e.g., Chacar et al., 2010). The findings also lend support to the
propositions made linking international diversification to compensation (Carpenter et al.,
2001; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). With the exception of Sanders and colleagues,
researchers have not yet to examine the impact of international elements on compensation.
Our findings demonstrate that the importance of institutional environments faced by
MNEs on their executive compensation to complement the large body of compensation
research in the national arena and on internal factors (e.g., Henderson & Fredrickson,
1996; Jensen & Murphy, 1990).
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Second, this study shows that institutional complexity faced by MNEs is another
level of elements in addition to the extent of international diversification. Past research
largely examines the effects of the extent of international diversification on MNE
performance and other outcomes (Contractor et al., 2003; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998).
This line of research has been criticized by leaving the core elements of MNEs untouched
(Verbeke, Li, & Goerzen, 2009). By controlling the extent of international diversification,
this study demonstrates that institutional complexity faced by MNEs indeed affects top
executive compensation.
Third, we also propose a novel way to zero in very precisely the actual national
institutional complexity of an MNE by examining the actual institutional environments
facing its web of subsidiaries. This approach is similar to the one developed by Goerzen
and Beamish (2003) which examines the relationship between an MNE’s environmental
complexity and MNE performance. Since MNEs simultaneously manage multiple
subsidiaries, this study emphasizes the importance of the MNE’s institutional complexity,
and more specifically dispersion within the MNE network.

This approach can help

supplement research focused on dyadic relationships between home and host countries (e.g.,
Kogut & Singh, 1988).
Managerial implications of this study are below. First, most researchers and
practitioners concern about whether top executives use their power to appropriate more rent
and receive greater compensation from their firms. However, this line of view merely
focuses on avoiding the self-interesting behaviors of top executives. To attract potential
executive candidates from markets and retain capable executives, the design of executive
compensation should base on the executive job requirements from the economics viewpoint.
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Our results offer valuable insights on the linkage between institutional complexity and
executive compensation. Additionally, monitoring function of a board and executive
incentives are traditionally viewed as two arms to protect the interests of shareholders.
Once one cannot fully function, another should substitute it. Since institutional complexity
may create challenges for boards to effectively monitor executives, the findings of this
study suggest that the boards can use the executive long-term compensation scheme to
direct the interests of executives toward those of shareholders.
This study is not without limitations. Three limitations, at least, of this study can
pave some avenues for future research. First, this study only examines the impact of
institutional complexity on executive compensation. It is likely that this institutional
complexity will also influence other elements within the MNEs, as well as strategic choices
and performance. For example, future research may examine how greater institutional
complexity affects boards of directors’ compensation and composition. Second, this study
focuses on the overall impacts of institutional complexity on executive compensation.
However, we may expect that additional institutional complexity associated with entering
new foreign countries may have greater impacts on the overall institutional complexity
faced by MNEs (Hutzschenreuter & Voll, 2007). Thus, future research may explore the
impact of additional institutional complexity on the change of executive compensation.
Finally, the design of internal elements may alleviate the top executives’ information load
in an MNE. These internal elements include MNE’s strategy (Wolf & Egelhoff, 2002),
structure (Egelhoff, 1991), and control mode (Chen, Park, & Newburry, 2009). Future
research hence may explore how these elements play as a moderating role on the
relationship between institutional complexity and executive compensation.
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III. TOP MANAGEMENT TEAM’S SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ITS
MODERATING ROLE ON VALUE CREATION AND
APPROPRIATION BY THE CEOS
INTRODUCTION
Investigating why some firms outperform others is a fundamental
question in the field of strategic management (Rumelt, Schendel, & Teece,
1991). Thus, drawing from the resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 1991;
Wernerfelt, 1984), abundant studies tried to answer this question (see Newbert,
2007 for a comprehensive review). For instance, past research has documented
that superior managerial capabilities, not only intellectual capital but also social
capital, can be a source of competitive advantage, and are associated with
greater firm performance (e.g., Carpenter, Sanders, and Gregerssn, 2001;
Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; Miller & Shamsie, 2001). However, without
exploring the rent appropriation within a firm, the answer is incomplete (Coff,
1999). Prior research, additionally, has indicated that top executives play a vital
role on rent creation as well as rent appropriation (Castanias & Helfat, 1991&
2001; Coff, 1999). Thus, examining both rent creation and rent appropriation,
this study aims to explore the effects of chief executive officers’ (CEOs’)
managerial capabilities, including intellectual and social capital, on firm
performance and CEO total compensation. This study, furthermore, explores
how the social capital of a top management team (TMT) affects the above
relationships.
One stream of research (e.g., Newbert, 2007) has focused on managerial
capabilities as a construct frequently used in the research of the resource-based
view of the firm. For example, viewing international assignment experience as
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valuable intellectual capital which can equip executives to better manage foreign
operations, Carpenter et al. (2001) demonstrated that this experience can
facilitate performance of multinational corporations. Additionally, Geletkanycz
and Hambrick (1997) demonstrated that the external intraindustry and
extraindustry social ties can provide necessary information to confirm the
effectiveness of strategic moves and, in turn, affect firm performance.
On the other hand, rent appropriation is an emerging topic in strategic
management and is starting to get attention from scholars. For example,
Chacar and Coff (2000) argued that star stock analysts, as knowledge workers,
have private information about their firms, and thus appropriate a large part of
rents, so their firms increase the volume of businesses but not firm profitability.
In addition, Blyler and Coff (2003) proposed that the social capital of
employees determines their rent appropriation capabilities. Since top
executives are at the top of a firm, they tend to have more opportunities to
appropriate rents. This stream of research examines the phenomenon of
managerial rent appropriation through insider trading of shares. For example,
Coff and Lee (2003) proposed that top executives have private information on
their firms, and thus they can gain personal benefits from the R&D
investments. In a similar vein, since top executives possess more knowledge
regarding the potential values of their firm’s patents, they can acquire personal
gains from a firm’s patent applications (Ahuja, Coff, & Lee, 2005).
Not only the CEO but also the other TMT members are at the top of a
firm (Hambrick, 2007; Pettigrew, 1992). They jointly make strategic decisions
for their firm so the CEO as well as their TMT members should have impacts
on firm performance. Additionally, an emerging line of research has indicated
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the importance of understanding interactions between CEOs and their TMT
members (Buyl, Boone, Hendriks, & Matthyssens, 2011; Klimoski & Koles,
2001). Since the social capital of a TMT reflects the information channels of
TMT members (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; Granovetter, 1985), it should
enhance the exercise of CEO’s managerial capabilities based on the
complementary viewpoint (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993). On the other hand,
TMT social capital may curtail the CEO’s ability on rent appropriation,
because the value of the CEO’s managerial capabilities is dependent on other
TMT members’ social capital.
Although rent creation and appropriation have drawn considerable
attention, researchers have mostly examined rent appropriation through insider
trading of shares. However, executives can get personal gain from insider
trading as well as their compensation. Moreover, how the social capital of the
TMT affects the CEO’s ability on rent creation and rent appropriation is, in
comparison, less investigated by prior research. Thus, based on the social
embeddedness lens, this study develops a strategic contingency theory of CEO
rent-creation and rent-appropriation. Greater social capital, or social ties, of
TMT members can assist their CEO to access a broad array of information and
to leverage critical resources from the external. Therefore, the social capital of a
TMT should facilitate the CEO’s managerial capabilities, including intellectual
and social capital, in the rent-creation process. On the other hand, the exercise of
a CEO’s managerial capabilities will rely on the TMT social capital.
Consequently, greater TMT social capital may lessen the CEO’s power on rent
appropriation. Based on a sample of 548 U.S. firms and 2,010 observations
from 2003 to 2009, this study found that greater TMT social capital, indeed,
42

facilitates the effects of the CEO intellectual and social capital on firm
performance.
The remainder of this study unfolds as follows. First, we discuss
theoretically how managerial capabilities translate into rent creation and the
moderating role of TMT social capital. In the following section, we discuss the
same question but related to rent appropriation. Then, the methods of this study,
including the sample, the operationalization of variables, and statistical models,
are discussed. Next, we present empirical results of this study. Finally, we
identify the contributions and limitations of this study as well as discuss avenues
for future research.
MANAGERIAL RENT CREATION
Top executives have long been argued to be important determinants of
organizational outcomes (e.g. Andrews, 1971; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). From
the strategic choice perspective, top management - the CEOs and their TMT
members - are the agents who make strategic choices based on the analysis of
internal resources and external environments, and thus the outcomes of these
strategic choices are determined by these top executives (e.g., Andrews, 1971;
Hambrick & Mason, 1984). In other words, this viewpoint implicitly proposes
that organizational performance is affected by the quality or efficiency of top
executives.
To examine the relationship between managerial resources and rents,
scholars further argued that top management can be the vital resource for rent
creation of a firm (Adner & Helfat, 2003; Castanias & Helfat, 1991 & 2001).
For example, Castanias and Helfat (1991) proposed that managerial skills
include generic, industry-related, and firm-specific skills. Because these skills
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are scarce, they generate Ricardian rents. In addition, industry-related and firmspecific skills are best used in particular circumstances. The use of them in other
circumstances, such as other firms or industries, may decrease their utilities so
these skills may generate quasi-rents. To summarize, not only do all managerial
skills generate Ricardian rents because of the scarce traits of managerial skills,
but also certain types of skills, such as industry-related and firm-specific, can
create quasi-rents, based on their specificity.
Since strategic management research is concerned with the long-term
rent-generation ability of a resource, Castanias and Helfat (1991) further argued
that managerial skills fit the criteria of isolating mechanisms (Rumelt, 1984)
from at least three viewpoints. First, most top executive’s tasks involve tacit and
hardly codifiable rather than explicit knowledge so it is difficult to identify the
causal relationship between managerial skills and organizational outcomes.
Consequently, managerial skills may have the characteristic of causal ambiguity.
Second, because these skills maybe tailored to particular firms or industries, they
are likely to have the trait of specialization. Third, not only is it difficult for
other competitors to imitate a firm’s managerial knowledge, but also these
managerial talents are not widely dispersed in each firm. Thus, managerial skills
tend to be unique.
In addition, Castanias and Helfat (2001) employed the lens of the
resource-based view of a firm to examine managerial resources. Managerial
resources are not homogeneous since each firm has a different quality and
quantity of top managers. Although top executives can migrate to other firms,
some of their skills or knowledge cannot be mobilized, because they can only be
applied in particular contexts. Thus, managerial resources meet two basic
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assumptions of the resource-based view of a firm. Castanias and Helfat (2001)
further argued that managerial resources are valuable, unique, difficult to imitate,
and difficult to substitute, and thus are a source of sustained competitive
advantages. In sum, based on the above arguments, managerial resources not
only generate a short-term performance but also lead to sustained competitive
advantages.
Business environments are dynamic rather than static. In order to achieve
the sustained competitive advantages, a firm needs to develop dynamic
capabilities to continually coordinate and reconfigure its resources to meet the
changing environments (e.g. Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). From the dynamic
capabilities perspective, Augier and Teece (2009) posited that management
plays an important role in developing dynamic capabilities. They proposed that
management creates, maintains, or changes organizational routines, integrates
resources to acquire complementarities and thus aligns internal resources with
external environments. Augier and Teece’s (2009) arguments echo Adner and
Helfat’s (2003) concept of dynamic managerial capabilities that top executives
efficiently develop, integrate, and deploy organizational resources and
competences. Thus, managerial capabilities are the critical base for a firm to
develop dynamic capabilities and thus generate rents.
CEO intellectual capital and rent creation
The critical role of managerial intellectual capital in strategic decisions
has been well documented (Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001). The impact of
managerial intellectual capital on organizational performance has also been
widely explored (Carpenter et al., 2001; Miller 1991; Miller & Shamsie, 2001,
Henderson, Miller, & Hambrick, 2006; Kor, 2003). The main reason for the
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importance of intellectual capital is that the skills of top executives largely come
from learning-by-doing processes (Mintzberg, 1973). These processes are highly
associated with the length of experience. Although other sources of information
and knowledge may confer managerial knowledge, these sources of information
and knowledge may be less beneficial, because they do not experience practice.
In addition, the application of managerial knowledge is highly context-specific,
since each firm faces different internal and external conditions.
In addition, from the path dependency viewpoint (Penrose, 1959; Nelson
& Winter, 1982), the accumulation of knowledge is beneficial for an
organization, because historical knowledge can assist a firm to better match its
capabilities and environments. Particularly, managerial tasks involve dealing
with complicated situations and tacit knowledge. Managerial tacit knowledge is
difficult to transfer among top executives or top executives and their apprentices.
Consequently, this study proposes that managerial intellectual capital is derived
from managerial position tenure. Viewing the CEO tenure as a life cycle,
Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) argued that CEOs with less experience
continually gain benefits from learning their internal and external environments.
However, after a certain point, past experience may constrain the CEOs’
cognitive ability, lead to inertia, and consequently negatively impact firm
performance. Thus, Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) suggest that the effect of
CEO tenure on firm performance is an inverted-U shape. This argument has also
been empirically validated (e.g., Miller & Shamsie, 2001). Consequently, this
study suggests:
Hypothesis 1a: The relationship between CEO intellectual capital and firm
performance is an inverted-U shape.
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CEO social capital and rent creation
Basically, managerial social capital derives from social relationships that
represent one agent’s influence, control, and power on the others (Adler &
Kwon, 2002). Although social ties have been categorized as internal and
external social ties, most research focuses on external social ties in the field of
strategic management. Interlocking directorships of executives, which refer to
executives’ board positions in other firms, especially, have been well
documented for the study of executives’ external social ties.
Executives’ interlocking directorships have several benefits for firms (see
Mizruchi, 1996 for a comprehensive review). First, executives’ interlocking
directorships can be important channels for a firm to access external resources.
Based on the resource dependence perspective (e.g., Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978),
when a firm lacks a critical resource, the firm will seek the resource from
external environments. In this case, the relationship between the firm and
external organizations is vital for the firm to acquire the resource. Interlocking
directorships of executives can assist a firm to secure external resources, and
even acquire external resources under more beneficial terms (e.g. Mizruchi &
Steams, 1994). Therefore, greater interlocking directorships may represent more
channels to access critical external resources and thus be beneficial for firm
performance.
In addition, interlocking directorships also play a critical role to access
external information. The main function of top executives is to make strategic
decisions for their firms. Top executives require related information to formulate
and assess alternatives and then select a proper one from these alternatives.
Under dynamic environments, information is critical for strategic decision47

making. Thus, interlocking directorships are critical channels for top executives
to access external information.
Ussem (1984) argued that top executives with greater social ties may have
better abilities to scan environments and foresee future trends. In addition,
sitting in other firms’ board positions, top executives have the chance to acquire
information regarding strategic formation and implementation of other firms.
For example, Haunschild (1993) found that the acquisition behaviors of a firm
are affected by its interlocking directorships with other firms. In addition,
linking interlocking directorships with organizational performance, Gelatkanycz
and Hambrick (1997) proposed that the alignment between information
requirements and the types of executives’ interlocking directorships will
enhance organizational performance. Thus, this study expects:
Hypothesis 1b: The greater extent of CEO social capital, the better the firm
performance.
TMT social capital and rent creation
The upper echelons of a firm include not only the CEO but also other
non-CEO executives. This study expects that TMT social capital can facilitate
firm performance, in addition to CEO social capital. The reason is that the more
interlocking directorships that the TMT members possess, the more benefits
from resources or information. These sufficient resources and information,
consequently, can be the bricks for firms to outperform other firms (Gelatkanycz
& Hambrick, 1997). Therefore:
Hypothesis 2: The greater extent of TMT social capital, the greater the
firm performance.
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The moderating role of TMT social capital on rent creation
In addition to viewing managerial resources individually, the interaction
between CEO and TMT capabilities should also be emphasized. This interaction
can be analyzed by the complementarity perspective (Amit & Schoemaker,
1993). Amit and Schoemaker (1993), basically, argued that the value of a
particular resource or capability for creating rents may depend on other
resources or capabilities. Applying to the upper echelons, Carmeli and Tishler
(2006) also posited that complementary managerial skills are the crucial
indicators of the quality of a TMT, because these skills can help a firm to
handle different managerial challenges. The concept of complementarities
applies not only to resources and capabilities but also to the social capital of
individuals or groups (Krishnan, Miller, & Judge, 1997). Based on Barney’s
(1986) argument, different functional backgrounds and knowledge could offset
each other and thus form complementary competencies. For example, in the
line of acquisition research, the effects of offsetting differences have been
posited to create acquisition value because functional weaknesses in one firm’s
TMT could be compensated by corresponding strengths in the other firm’s
TMT (e.g. Porter, 1987).
According to the embeddedness perspective (Granovetter, 1985), strategic
actions of firms are affected and constrained by the social capital or networks of
the firms because social capital or networks determine the abilities of firms to
search for information and critical resources (Mizruchi, 1996). A firm contains
not only CEO but also TMT social capital at its top. Consequently, TMT social
capital should affect the exercise of CEO intellectual and social capital.
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Firms may benefit from greater CEO intellectual capital frequently
associated with greater learning-by-doing processes. However, these capabilities
may have negative impacts on firm performance. The reason is that as the CEO
intellectual capital accumulated, CEOs may shape their perception, limit their
information stimuli, and become less open-minded (Hambrick & Fukutomi,
1991). Since critical strategic decisions are usually made jointly by the CEOs
and their TMT members, greater TMT social capital, which broadens
information channels during strategic decision-making, may lessen the negative
impact of CEO intellectual capital on firm performance. The combination of
CEO intellectual capital and TMT social capital can greatly benefit from both
the CEO’s learning-by-doing processes and information channels of the TMT,
which may have sufficient external information to detect and predict industrial
trends and environmental changes. Thus, this study proposes:
Hypothesis 3: TMT social capital moderates the relationship between CEO
intellectual capital and firm performance in such a way that effects are more
positive in the contexts of greater TMT social capital.
CEO as well as TMT social capital can be information and resource
channels, and thus are beneficial to firm performance (Gelatkanycz &
Hambrick, 1997). In this study, we expect that the greatest benefits can be
acquired by having both greater CEO and TMT social capital. Thus, we argue:
Hypothesis 4: TMT social capital moderates the relationship between CEO
social capital and firm performance in such a way that effects are more
positive in the contexts of greater TMT social capital.

50

MANAGERIAL RENT APPROPRIATION
The use of managerial capabilities or resources is not without costs.
However, the resource-based view of the firm only concerns the ability of a
resource to create rents for a firm, but does not answer the question of how the
rents are divided among internal stakeholders. Coff (1999) was among the
pioneers to address this question. Integrating the bargaining power theory into
the resource-based view of the firm, Coff (1999) argued that competitive
advantages do not always generate rents for a firm. He further proposed that
we should distinguish the rent appropriation from the rent creation when we
explore organizational performance.
Coff (1999) portrayed a firm as a nexus of contracts (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976), and thus only individuals, instead of a firm, can appropriate
rents. Based on the bargaining power theories such as resource dependence
theory (e.g. Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) or Porter’s (1980) five market forces
framework, Coff (1999) further posited that rent-appropriation ability is based
on the bargaining power of internal stakeholders. The bargaining power is
stronger when stakeholders: can act as a collective union, can generate high
replacement cost to the firm, have access to key information, and have low
switch costs. Therefore, valuable resources or capabilities can generate rents,
but the rents may be appropriated by other inside stakeholders rather than
shareholders.
Focusing on managerial capabilities, Castanias and Helfat (2001)
proposed that top executives both create and appropriate rents. Unlike other
rent appropriation research (e.g. Chacar & Coff, 2000) that implicitly assumes
that rent appropriation among stakeholders is under given rents, Castanias and
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Helfat (2001) proposed that rents appropriated by top executives can be
incentives for top executives and thus drive them to create more rents for their
firms. They call this a win-win situation. Thus, managerial capabilities or
capital can not only create rents for a firm but also appropriate them from the
firm.
Based on the basic economic rationales, the supply of managerial
capabilities or capital also determines the extent of managerial rent
appropriation. Since incumbent CEOs accumulate firm-specific knowledge
and build their external networks, recruiting new CEOs from external markets
may not fully replace the incumbents. Firms may prefer to recruit new CEOs
internally rather than externally. Therefore, internal managerial labor markets
become important, and the quality of internal managerial resources becomes an
issue. When TMT members possess equal or higher quality managerial
capabilities, the bargaining power of CEOs’ managerial capabilities will be
decreased. Particularly, TMT social capital may constrain the function or use
of CEO intellectual and social capital and thus curtail the rent appropriation
ability of the CEO. This rationale also reflects Coff’s (1999) argument that
replacement cost to the firm is positively associated with the bargaining power
of the inside stakeholders. In conclusion, managerial capabilities with fewer
substitutes and without necessary complements appropriate greater portions of
rents, and vice versa.
CEO intellectual capital and rent appropriation
Based on the economic rationales, CEO compensation should reflect their
unique abilities and skills. For instance, from the loss of managerial skills
viewpoint, Harris and Helfat (1997) found that external CEO successors ask for
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higher non-contingent compensation in order to compensate the loss of their
prior firm-specific knowledge. Categorizing external CEO successors based on
whether they are from the same industry or not, Harris and Helfat (1997) further
showed that new CEOs from other industries may gain higher non-contingent
compensation to compensate the loss of their industry-specific knowledge.
Under the context of the sudden death of a highly paid executive, Combs and
Skill (2003) also showed that stock price decreases reflecting the loss of superior
human resources.
From the managerial rent appropriation aspect (Coff, 1999), CEO
intellectual capital not only helps the CEO to access valuable information from
organizational routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982) but also create a nonreplaceable position in the firm. The power associated with greater CEO
intellectual capital can help the CEO to bargain for and gain higher
compensation. Thus, this study argues:
Hypothesis 5a: The greater extent of CEO intellectual capital, the greater
the CEO total compensation.
CEO social capital and rent appropriation
Based on the value of external information and resources that CEO social
capital brings into a firm, Geletkanycz, Boyd, and Finkelstein (2001) found that
greater CEO external directorships lead to greater CEO total compensation.
Thus, based on the logic of managerial rent appropriation (Coff, 1999), this
study also expects:
Hypothesis 5b: The greater extent of CEO social capital, the greater the
CEO total compensation.
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TMT social capital and rent appropriation
According to Coff’s (1999) argument that bargaining power can be
determined by the availability of substitutes, the value of CEO social capital
may be affected by these substitutes. This study argues that TMT social capital
may be strategically equivalent to CEO social capital. Thus, from the internal
managerial labor market viewpoint, the influence of CEO’s external social ties
on higher compensation may be diminished when TMT social capital is greater.
Therefore:
Hypothesis 6: The greater extent of TMT social capital, the less the CEO
total compensation.
The moderating role of TMT social capital on rent creation
In addition to examining the direct effect of substitutes from TMT social
capital on CEO total compensation, this study examines their indirect effects.
For CEOs to fully acquire the benefits of CEO intellectual and social capital,
TMT social capital is critical. Grounded by the rent appropriation aspect (Coff,
1999), this study expects that TMT social capital can weaken the CEO’s abilities
to appropriate rent from their firms. Therefore:
Hypothesis 7: TMT social capital moderates the relationship between CEO
intellectual capital and CEO total compensation in such a way that effects
are more positive in the contexts of less TMT social capital.
Hypothesis 8: TMT social capital moderates the relationship between CEO
social capital and CEO total compensation in such a way that effects are
more positive in the contexts of less TMT social capital.
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METHODS
Sample and Data Collection
Our sample was drawn from publicly traded firms which have sales
revenue greater than $5 million from 2003 to 2009. We obtained data from the
following sources: (a) firm performance and other industry and firm-level
financial data were collected from the Compustat database; (b) data on
international diversification was taken from the Directory of Corporate
Affiliations; (c) the CEO and TMT data were acquired from the Compustat
ExecuComp database; and (d) the board characteristic data was taken from the
Corporate Library database. To limit the reverse causality issue, this study
lagged the data of the independent and control variables by one year.
Consequently, data on independent and control variables are from 2002 to
2008. After merging data from the above sources and dropping observations
with missing values, our final sample contains 548 firms and 2,010
observations.
Statistical Model
We tested our proposed hypotheses by the fixed-effects regressions
models. The fixed-effects regressions models are suitable for analyzing a panel
data set which is the data format of this study. Additionally, this study tested
interaction effects, so independent, moderating, and control variables were
standardized before they entered into the regression models in order to lessen the
possible issue of multicolinearity resulting from the inclusion of the moderators
in the regression models.
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Variables
Below the definition and operationalization of variables is introduced.
The summary of variable definition and data sources is in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 Variable Definition and Data Sources for Essay 2
Variable
Firm performance
CEO total compensation

Description

Source

Firm performance is measured by sales growth, (𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑡 −
𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑡−1 )/𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑡−1 ∗ 100

1

𝑙𝑛 ∑(𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 + 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠 + 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 − 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛 +
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)

2

CEO intellectual capital is measured by CEO tenure,
length of years that a CEO serves at the CEO position

2

CEO social capital

CEO social capital is measured by CEO’s interlocking
directorships, the number of directorships a CEO has

3

TMT social capital

TMT social capital is measured by TMT interlocking
directorships, summing the counts of directorships which
non-CEO executives have over the number of non-CEO
executives

3

Industry profitability

Industry ROA =
∑𝑛𝑖�𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒�𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 � ∗ 1/𝑛 *100

1

Chatterjee and Wernerfelt’s measure

4

CEO intellectual capital

n: the total number of firms with the same three-digits
SIC codes excluding the focal firm
Product diversification

Product diversification = ∑𝑗 𝑑𝑖ℎ 𝑝𝑖𝑗

𝑑𝑖ℎ : It is a distance of a business segment to the largest
business segment of the MNE based on SIC code; 0 if
they have the same four-digit SIC codes; 1 if they have
the same three-digit SIC code, and ect.
𝑝𝑖𝑗 : sales in j business segment/total sales

The number of host countries which an MNE has
subsidiaries located.

5

R&D intensity

R&D spending/total sales * 100

1

Firm profitability

ROA = net income/total assets *100

1

International
diversification
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Firm size

The total assets of an MNE

1

Board size

The number of directors on a board

3

Outside director ratio

The number of outside directors/the number of total
directors*100

3

CEO duality

Dummy =1 if a CEO is also the chairperson and 0
otherwise

3

TMT size

A count of the total number of top officers in an MNE

2

TMT average firm tenure

The mean of executives’ firm tenure

2

Note: 1.Compustat database; 2. Compustat ExecuComp database; 3. Corporate Library database;
4. Compustat Segment database; 5. Directory of Corporate Affiliations database

Dependent Variables
Since this study examines managerial rent creation and appropriation,
both firm performance and CEO total compensation are dependent variables of
this study. This study employs sales growth, (𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑡 − 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑡−1 )/𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑡−1 ∗ 100,
to measure firm performance. In addition to sales growth, other performance
indicators, such as return on assets (ROA) or return on sales (ROS), have been
used by prior research. This study chose sales growth rather than other indicators
based on the following three reasons. First, an indicator of change is more likely
to capture recent rather historical influences (Simons, Pelled, & Smith, 1999).
Second, sales change is closely linked to the fundamental rationale of social
influences (Peng, 2004). More importantly, Chacar and Coff (2000) have
indicated that cross performance, such as the volume of sales or sales growth,
compared to residual performance, such as ROA or ROS, is a better indicator to
reflect rent creation. In addition, this study uses the natural log of CEO total
compensation, including CEO base salary, annual bonus, and other annual
compensation, to measure the amount of rents that have been appropriated by
the CEOs.
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Independent variables
CEO intellectual capital. Intellectual capital can be captured by length of
experience, such as length of a managerial position or the firm service. Thus,
this study uses CEO tenure to measure CEO intellectual capital. CEO tenure is
defined as length of years that a CEO serves at the CEO position.
CEO social capital. Social capital, largely, is reflected by external social
ties. Among various managerial external social ties, the important role of
interlocking directorships has been identified (Mizruchi, 1996). Thus, this study
employs a CEO’s interlocking directorships as CEO social capital. The CEO’s
interlocking directorships are measured by counting the number of directorships
a CEO has.
TMT social capital. Similar to CEO directorships, this study measures
TMT social capital as TMT interlocking directorships. It was calculated by
summing the counts of directorships which non-CEO executives have over the
number of non-CEO executives.
Control variables
Industry profitability. Industry profitability here reflects generally the
profitability of a firm’s competitors in a particular industry. Average industry
ROA which is the percentage of the industry net income over industry total
assets is used to measure industry performance. The data on an industry are
based on firms with the same three-digit standard industrial classification (SIC)
code but exclude the focal firms.
Product diversification. Product diversification was controlled by this
study with product diversification measured using Chatterjee and Wernerfelt’s
entropy measure (1991).
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International diversification. International diversification in this study
is measured by the number of foreign countries in which the firms have
subsidiaries located. The measure of international diversification is in line
with prior research (e.g. Geringer, Beamish, & DaCosta. 1989).
R&D intensity. This study used R&D intensity to be a proxy for
innovation. We measured R&D intensity by the ratio of R&D spending over
total sales.
Firm profitability. Return on assets (ROA), an accounting-based
profitability measure, is frequently used by prior research (Carpenter et al.,
2001). Thus, we used ROA, the percentage of the net income over total assets,
as the indicator of firm profitability.
Firm size. Firm size can influence the ability of a firm to grow. Thus,
total assets of a firm are used to measure firm size.
Board size. Board size is one of the important corporate governance
variables. It was calculated by the number of directors on a board.
Outside director ratio. Outside director ratio can reflect the extent of
board vigilance and thus impact firm performance. The outside director ratio
was measured by the number of outside directors over the total number of
directors.
CEO duality. This variable is a dummy variable. When a CEO is also
the chairperson, the value of 1 was coded. Otherwise, the value of 0 was
assigned.
TMT size. This study used a count of the number of top executives to
measure TMT size, following past research (Carpenter et al., 2001; Simons et
al., 1999).
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TMT average firm tenure. The mean of executives’ firm tenure was
used to measure TMT average firm tenure.
RESULTS
Table 3.2 presents means and standard deviations for all variables.
Additionally, Table 3.3 shows correlations for all variables. We report the
results of the fixed-effects regression analyses for firm performance in Table
3.4. In Table 3.4, model 1 is the baseline model where only control variables
are included. The model is significant (F = 11.79; p <.001). In the baseline
model, we found that R&D intensity, firm profitability, and CEO duality have
significant positive impacts on sales growth (b = 7.707, p <.001; b = 3.168, p
<.001; b = 3.828, p <.05, respectively). However, Product diversification, firm
size, and outside director ratio are negatively associated with sales growth (b =
-4.715, p <.05; b = -10.904, p <.01; b = -6.715, p <.001).
Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics for Essay 2

1
Sales growth
2
CEO total compensation
3
Industry Profitability
4
Product diversification
5
International diversification
6
R&D intensity
7
Firm profitability
8
Firm size
9
Board size
10
Outside director ratio
11
CEO duality
12
TMT size
13
TMT average firm tenure
14
CEO intellectual capital
15
CEO social capital
16
TMT social capital
Note: N=2010
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Mean

SD

7.48
7.98
4.14
0.31
2.56
8.43
3.60
7.60
8.94
68.29
0.55
4.86
11.26
9.28
1.49
0.84

24.37
1.05
9.71
0.59
6.92
31.94
14.86
36.43
2.22
14.90
0.50
1.21
8.73
8.62
0.86
0.84

Table 3.3 Correlations for Essay 2
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Sales growth
1.00
CEO total
2
0.15 1.00
compensation
Industry
3
0.06 0.05 1.00
Profitability
Product
4
-0.01 0.17 -0.02 1.00
diversification
International
5
-0.05 0.24 0.02 0.10 1.00
diversification
6
R&D intensity
0.17 -0.02 0.03 -0.06 0.02 1.00
Firm
0.14 0.17 0.06 0.02 0.04 -0.26 1.00
7
profitability
8
Firm size
0.01 0.21 -0.01 0.22 0.12 -0.03 0.01 1.00
9
Board size
0.01 0.41 0.02 0.24 0.19 -0.08 0.11 0.29 1.00
Outside
-0.13 0.20 0.05 0.08 0.14 0.01 -0.03 0.04 0.10 1.00
10
director ratio
11
CEO duality
0.04 0.10 -0.04 0.08 0.02 -0.10 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.10
12
TMT size
-0.06 0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.03 0.01 -0.11 0.00 0.13 0.07
TMT average
0.04 -0.01 -0.04 0.06 0.04 -0.07 0.09 0.14 0.14 -0.30
13
firm tenure
CEO
intellectual
0.03 -0.11 0.00 -0.04 -0.06 0.01 0.05 -0.05 -0.12 -0.17
14
capital
CEO social
0.05 0.24 0.04 0.12 0.09 -0.03 0.05 0.04 0.21 0.13
15
capital
TMT social
16
0.14 0.16 0.01 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.10 0.23 -0.21
capital
Note: N=2010; All correlations larger than .05 in absolute value are significant at the p=.05 level.

11

12

13

14

15

1.00
-0.04

1.00

-0.07

-0.08

1.00

0.40

-0.15

0.13

1.00

0.11

0.04

-0.07

-0.05

1.00

0.00

0.08

0.09

-0.02

0.19

16

1

61

1.00

Table 3.4 Results of Fixed-effects Linear Regression Analyses for Sales Growth
Variables
Constant
Industry Profitability
Product diversification
International
diversification
R&D intensity
Firm profitability
Firm size
Board size
Outside director ratio
CEO duality
TMT size
TMT average firm
tenure

Model 1
5.371***
[1.137]
0.844
[0.679]
-4.715*
[2.061]
-2.180
[1.548]
7.707***
[1.252]
3.168***
[0.696]
-10.904**
[3.690]
-1.981
[1.418]
-6.715***
[0.972]
3.828*
[1.875]
-0.467
[0.741]
-0.778
[1.318]

CEO intellectual capital
CEO intellectual capital
squared

Model 2
2.939†
[1.588 ]
0.823
[0.679]
-4.146*
[2.072]
-2.173
[1.548]
7.696***
[1.250]
3.152***
[0.696]
-10.000**
[3.705]
-1.736
[1.423]
-6.647***
[0.974]
6.431**
[2.179]
-0.544
[0.742]
-1.054
[1.329]
-4.207*
[1.784]
1.000
[0.682]

CEO social capital

Model 3
5.597***
[1.139 ]
0.737
[0.679]
-4.933*
[2.059]
-2.097
[1.545]
7.778***
[1.250]
2.998***
[0.698]
-10.941**
[3.683]
-1.966
[1.415]
-6.686***
[0.970]
3.417 †
[1.878]
-0.320
[0.742]
-0.735
[1.315]

2.091*
[0.820]

TMT social capital
CEO intellectual capital
* TMT social capital
CEO social capital *
TMT social capital
No. of firms
No. of observations
F value

548
2010
11.79***

548
2010
10.44***
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548
2010
11.39***

Model 4
5.018***
[1.131]
0.783
[0.675]
-4.989*
[2.047]
-1.760
[1.539]
7.709***
[1.242]
3.179***
[0.691]
-9.942**
[3.668]
-2.420 †
[1.411]
-5.361***
[1.006]
4.471*
[1.866]
-0.473
[0.735]
-0.538
[1.309]

3.668***
[0.771]

548
2010
12.86***

Table 3.4 Results of Fixed-effects Linear Regression Analyses for Sales Growth
(cont.)
Variables
Constant
Industry Profitability
Product diversification
International
diversification
R&D intensity
Firm profitability
Firm size
Board size
Outside director ratio
CEO duality
TMT size
TMT average firm
tenure
CEO intellectual capital
CEO intellectual capital
squared

Model 5
4.129**
[1.251]
0.742
[0.673]
-4.665*
[2.049]
-1.845
[1.537]
7.688***
[1.239]
3.204***
[0.689]
-9.714**
[3.670]
-2.232
[1.413]
-5.395***
[1.003]
6.187**
[2.103]
-0.379
[0.734]
-0.646
[1.320]
-2.928*
[1.266]

CEO social capital
TMT social capital

4.640***
[0.846]
2.829**
[1.058]

Model 6
5.021***
[1.135]
0.763
[0.674]
-5.197*
[2.042]
-2.038
[1.541]
7.723***
[1.239]
3.098***
[0.693]
-10.041**
[3.657]
-2.384†
[1.406]
-5.535***
[1.005]
4.099*
[1.868]
-0.287
[0.736]
-0.686
[1.307]

Model 7
4.157**
[1.252]
0.722
[0.672]
-4.880*
[2.044]
-2.125
[1.539]
7.703***
[1.235]
3.123***
[0.691]
-9.826**
[3.659]
-2.202
[1.408]
-5.567***
[1.002]
5.774**
[2.102]
-0.193
[0.734]
-0.784
[1.317]
-2.879*
[1.263]

1.268
[0.848]
2.871***
[0.821]

1.273
[0.846]
3.852***
[0.889]
2.845**
[1.055]
1.046*
[0.436]
548
2010
11.14***

CEO intellectual capital
* TMT social capital
CEO social capital *
1.054*
TMT social capital
[0.437]
No. of firms
548
548
No. of observations
2010
2010
F value
11.88***
11.87***
Notes:
1.
S.E. in square brackets.
2.
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.10; t test are all two-tailed tests.
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Models 2 to 4 add three predictors, separately. Additionally, Models 5 and 6
examine the moderating effects of TMT social capital on the relationships between
CEO managerial capabilities, including CEO intellectual and social capital, and sales
growth. Finally, Model 7 presents the full model. Models 2 to 7 are all significant (F
=10.44, P < .001; F = 11.39, P < .001; F = 12.86, P < .001; F = 11.88, P < .001; F =
11.87, P < .001; F = 11.14, P < .001, respectively).
In Hypothesis 1a, we propose that the relationship between CEO intellectual
capital and firm performance is an inverted-U shape. However, the coefficients for the
CEO intellectual capital are negative in Model 2 (b = -4.207, p <.05) and Model 7 (b
= -2.879, p <.05). The coefficient for the CEO intellectual capital squared is not
significant in Model 2 (b = 1.000, p >.10). Consequently, Hypothesis 1a is not
supported. Hypothesis 1b proposes that CEO social capital is positively associated
with firm performance.

Hypothesis 1b receives marginal support because the

coefficient for CEO social capital is significant in Model 3 (b = 2.091, p <.05) but not
in Model 7 (b = 1.273, p >.10). In Hypothesis 2, we expect that TMT social capital is
positively associated with firm performance. This argument is supported in Model 4
(b = 3.668, p <.001) as well as in Model 7 (b = 3.852, p <.001).
The moderating effects of TMT social capital on the relationships between
CEO intellectual capital, CEO social capital, and firm performance are proposed in
Hypotheses 3 and 4. Hypothesis 3 suggests that the positive relationship between
CEO intellectual capital and firm performance will be strengthened, when TMT social
capital is greater. Hypothesis 3 is supported in Model 5 (b = 2.829, p <.01) and Model
7 (b = 2.845, p <.01). Figure 3.1 presents the graph. Furthermore, Hypothesis 4
proposes that TMT social capital can strengthen the positive relationship between
CEO social capital and firm performance. Indeed, this argument is supported in
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Model 6 (b = 1.054, p <.05) and Model 7 (b = 1.046, p <.05). Figure 3.2 shows this
graph.
Figure 3.1 Relationship between Sales Growth and CEO Intellectual Capital at
Different Levels of TMT Social Capital
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Figure 3.2 Relationship between Sales Growth and CEO Social Capital at
Different Levels of TMT Social Capital
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In addition to managerial rent creation in Table 3.4, Table 3.5 provides the
results of fixed-effects linear regression analyses for CEO total compensation, or rent
appropriation by CEOs. Model 8 of Table 3.5 is a baseline model encompassing only
control variables. The results show that firm profitability and TMT average firm
tenure have strong positive effects on CEO total compensation (b = 0.048, p <.01; b =
0.054, p <.10, respectively). However, TMT size has a negative impact on CEO total
compensation (b = -0.067, p <.001). The main effects of independent variables are
included in models 9 to 11. Models 12 and 13 add moderating factors one at a time.
Finally, the full model, including all main and interaction effects, is displayed in
model 14.
Hypotheses 5a and 5b predict that both CEO intellectual capital and CEO social
capital are positively associated with CEO total compensation. However, these two
hypotheses are not supported in Models 9, 10, and 14. Hypothesis 6 predicts that
TMT social capital will be negatively associated with CEO total compensation. This
hypothesis receives marginal evidence, because the coefficient for TMT social capital
is significant and negative in Model 11 (b = -0.040, p <.05) but not Model 14 (b = 0.033, p >.10).
Hypothesis 7 predicts that interaction between CEO intellectual capital and
TMT social capital will be negatively associated with CEO total compensation. From
Model 12 and Model 14 of Table 3.4, the interaction coefficient (CEO intellectual
capital * TMT social capital) is insignificant (b = 0.041, p > .10; b = 0.041, p > .10)
and thus Hypothesis 7 is not supported. Hypothesis 8 expects that the interaction
between CEO and TMT social capital will be negatively associated with CEO total
compensation. From Model 13 and Model 14 of Table 3.4, the interaction coefficient
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(CEO social capital * TMT social capital) is not significant (b = 0.010, p > .10; b =
0.010, p > .10). Therefore, Hypothesis 8 is not supported.
Table 3.5 Results of Fixed-effects Linear Regression Analyses for CEO Total
Compensation
Variables
Constant
Industry Profitability
Product diversification
International
diversification
R&D intensity
Firm profitability
Firm size
Board size
Outside director ratio
CEO duality
TMT size
TMT average firm
tenure

Model 8
7.970***
[0.028]
0.002
[0.017]
-0.010
[0.051]
0.052
[0.038]
0.050
[0.031]
0.048**
[0.017]
0.098
[0.091]
-0.003
[0.035]
0.025
[0.024]
0.022
[0.046]
-0.067***
[0.018]
0.054†
[0.033]

CEO intellectual capital

Model 9
7.971***
[0.031]
0.002
[0.017]
-0.011
[0.051]
0.052
[0.038]
0.050
[0.031]
0.048**
[0.017]
0.098
[0.092]
-0.003
[0.035]
0.025
[0.024]
0.020
[0.053]
-0.067***
[0.018]
0.054
[0.033]
0.002
[0.031]

CEO social capital

Model 10
7.970***
[0.028]
0.002
[0.017]
-0.010
[0.051]
0.052
[0.038]
0.050
[0.031]
0.048**
[0.017]
0.098
[0.092]
-0.003
[0.035]
0.025
[0.024]
0.022
[0.047]
-0.067***
[0.018]
0.054†
[0.033]
0.001
[0.020]

TMT social capital
CEO intellectual capital
* TMT social capital
CEO social capital *
TMT social capital
No. of firms
No. of observations
F value

548
2010
3.17***

548
2010
2.90***
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548
2010
2.90***

Model 11
7.973***
[0.028]
0.002
[0.017]
-0.007
[0.051]
0.048
[0.038]
0.050
[0.031]
0.048**
[0.017]
0.088
[0.092]
0.002
[0.035]
0.011
[0.025]
0.015
[0.047]
-0.067***
[0.018]
0.051
[0.033]

-0.040*
[0.019]

548
2010
3.26***

Table 3.5
Results of Fixed-effects Linear Regression Analyses for CEO Total
Compensation (cont.)
Variables
Constant
Industry Profitability
Product diversification
International
diversification
R&D intensity
Firm profitability
Firm size
Board size
Outside director ratio
CEO duality
TMT size
TMT average firm
tenure
CEO intellectual capital

Model 12
7.978***
[0.031]
0.002
[0.017]
-0.009
[0.051]
0.045
[0.038]
0.050
[0.031]
0.048**
[0.017]
0.082
[0.092]
0.001
[0.035]
0.011
[0.025]
0.009
[0.053]
-0.066***
[0.018]
0.055†
[0.033]
-0.026
[0.021]

Model 13
7.972***
[0.028]
0.003
[0.017]
-0.008
[0.051]
0.045
[0.039]
0.049
[0.031]
0.049**
[0.017]
0.087
[0.092]
0.002
[0.035]
0.009
[0.025]
0.014
[0.047]
-0.066***
[0.018]
0.050
[0.033]
-0.002
[0.021]

-0.003
[0.032]
0.041
[0.026]

-0.046*
[0.021]

CEO social capital
TMT social capital

Model 14
7.976***
[0.031]
0.003
[0.017]
-0.009
[0.051]
0.042
[0.039]
0.049
[0.031]
0.049**
[0.017]
0.081
[0.092]
0.001
[0.035]
0.009
[0.025]
0.007
[0.053]
-0.065***
[0.018]
0.054
[0.033]
-0.002
[0.032]
-0.002
[0.021]
-0.033
[0.022]
0.041
[0.026]
0.010
[0.011]
548
2010
2.65***

CEO intellectual capital
* TMT social capital
CEO social capital *
0.010
TMT social capital
[0.011]
No. of firms
548
548
No. of observations
2010
2010
F value
2.97***
2.86***
Notes:
1.
S.E. in square brackets.
2.
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.10; t test are all two-tailed tests.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study is to explore the rent creation and appropriation at the
top of a firm. Based on the rent creation and appropriation perspectives, this study
explores the direct effects of CEO intellectual capital, CEO social capital, and TMT
social capital on firm performance and CEO total compensation. This study further
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examines how TMT social capital acts as a moderator in the CEO rent-creation and
rent-appropriation processes. Our results indeed found that a proper fit between CEOintellectual capital and TMT social capital achieves superior firm performance. This
study also demonstrated that TMT social capital can enhance the relationship between
CEO social capital and firm performance. However, our results did not show any
evidence to support the argument that TMT social capital can lessen CEO rentappropriation ability.
This study also has some research implications. First, this study underscores the
importance of managerial intellectual capital as well as managerial social capital on
firm performance. The critical role of these two constructs has been frequently
proposed, (e.g., Newbert, 2007) but they are rarely examined simultaneously. In order
to advance our understanding of the contributions of these two constructs on firm
performance, we examine their implications on firm performance in this study.
Additionally, this study contributes by showing that rent creation is jointly determined
by both CEOs and their TMT members. Most past research either explores the impact
of CEOs on firm performance or views a CEO as one member of the TMT
(Henderson et al., 2006; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). However, the interactions
between CEOs and their TMTs receive less attention. In order to fill this gap, this
study explores the complementary role of TMT social capital on the CEO managerial
capabilities to affect firm performance. Finally, this study contributes by
simultaneously examining value creation and appropriation at the top of a firm.
This study is not without limitations. First, intellectual and social capital of top
executives are multifaceted constructs. This study merely uses CEO tenure and
interlocking directorships to be proxies of these two constructs, respectively. Thus,
future research may use surveys or multiple archival data sources to gain multifaceted
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dimensions of intellectual and social capital of top executives. Secondly, this study
only concerns the quantity of managerial intellectual and social capital but leaves the
quality of those without considerations. Future studies may include the quality of
managerial intellectual and social capital in their models. For instance, future research
may examine the impacts of managerial bridging ties or managerial structural holes
on firm performance. Finally, following the above suggestion, future research may
view the TMT as the analysis unit of managerial social ties and investigate whether
the TMT members’ social ties can complement or substitute those of their CEO.
The managerial applications of this study have, at least, the following two
perspectives. First, this study demonstrates the importance of TMT social capital on
firm performance. In other words, firms which would like to achieve rapid growth
should be equipped with TMT members possessing greater social capital or social ties.
Moreover, this study emphasizes the importance of fit between the managerial
capabilities of CEOs and the social capital of their TMTs. The findings of this study
show that the performance implications of the managerial capabilities of CEOs
depend on TMT social capital. For instance, CEOs with greater intellectual capital, or
longer CEO position tenure, require matching with TMT members possessing greater
social capital in order to maximize their firm performance.
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IV. THE IMPACT OF A FIRM’S INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITY, TOP
MANAGEMENT TEAM TURNOVER, AND TOP MANAGEMENT
TEAM SIZE ON FIRM PERFORMANCE: A STRATEGIC
CONTINGENCY PERSPECTIVE
INTRODUCTION
Research on the relationship between multinationality and performance has
traditionally focused on the impact of international diversification by considering it as
an internal resource (e.g., Hitt, Tihanyi, Miller, & Connelly, 2006; Tallman & Li,
1996). Recent research, however, points to the need of examining both the external
and internal environment a multinational enterprise (MNE) faces to truly understand
its performance (e.g., Verbeke, Li, & Goerzen, 2009). Studies in this line of research
have emphasized the importance of examining closely the external institutional
environment that MNEs face, an environment that likely varies by firm and country
(e.g., Chacar, Newburry, & Vissa, 2010; Delios & Henisz, 2003; Kostova & Roth,
2002; Mudambi & Navarra, 2002; Verbeke et al., 2009). Simultaneously, another
stream of research has focused on the internal environment of the firm and stresses
that top executives are an important determinant of organizational outcomes (e.g.
Andrews, 1971; Hambrick& Mason, 1984). Moreover, several authors observe that
top management teams (TMTs) are heterogeneous across MNEs (e.g., Birkinshaw,
Toulan, & Arnold, 2001; Geringer, Beamish, & daCosta, 1989; Ghoshal, Korine, &
Szulanski, 1994), and likely affect their performance.
This study expands current research along these directions by examining the
impact on MNE performance of institutional complexity and two important top
management team characteristics, namely TMT size and turnover (e.g. Amason &
Sapienza, 1997; Gordon, Stewart, Sweo, & Luker, 2000). As firms internationalize,
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top executives have to examine and understand multiple institutional environments in
the host countries where their foreign subsidiaries are located. This increases the
information-processing needs and makes the decision making more challenging (e.g.,
Andrews, 1971; Child, 1972; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Porter, 1985; Sanders &
Carpenter, 1998). As a result, not only the extent of international diversification, but
also the diversity in the national institutional environments facing an MNE network,
which we term institutional complexity, matters.
MNEs, however, may be able to devise adequate strategies to deal with the
diversity of institutional environments. They can enhance their informationprocessing capabilities (IPCs) by increasing the size of their TMT (Haleblian &
Finkelstein, 1993), and/or decreasing their TMT turnover (Dess & Shaw, 2001;
Wiersema & Bantel, 1993).

In this study we argue that when an institutional

environment is complex, TMT turnover leads to the loss of accumulated managerial
knowledge, while a larger TMT size can increase IPCs. Hence we propose that MNEs
with greater TMT size and lower TMT turnover are likely to perform better when
facing a high institutional complexity. Focusing on the latter, we zero in on the
formal and informal institutions that characterize the national institutional
environment, namely political and cultural institutions (e.g., Meyer, Mudambi,
&Narula, 2011; Schwens, Eiche, &Kabst, 2011). Our empirical findings, based on
301 U.S. firms with 1,404 observations from 2002 to 2009 indeed support the
arguments of this study.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we
discuss a theory of MNE’s information-processing demands resulting from
institutional complexity and the implications of this theory for MNE performance.
Then we examine the role of managerial IPCs in MNEs’ operations as well as their
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implications for MNE performance. Further, the study proposes a strategic
contingency theory of the impact of institutional complexity on firm performance. In
the methods section we describe the empirical setting, the main variables, and the
statistical model. Next, we present the results. Finally, we conclude by summarizing
study’s main contributions and identifying directions of future research.
INFORMATION PROCESSING DEMANDS AND THE MNE
The importance role of information-processing demands on the operations of a
firm has been identified (Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996; Madhavan & Prescott,
1995). In order to enhance the likelihood of making accurate strategic-decisions, firms
require gathering, transferring, communicating, analyzing, and storing information
effectively (Galbraith, 1973). Compared to domestic firms, MNEs are a complex form
of organization (Ghoshal & Nohria, 1989). This complex form leads to demanding
greater extents of information-processing on top executives of these MNEs (Egelhoff,
1991). This information-processing results from multiple sources of international
operations. For instance, the top management of MNEs demands to take
dissimilarities in social values or national cultures (Kogut & Singh, 1988) and in
political systems (Henisz, 2000) between their home and host countries into
considerations, when making strategic decisions. Additionally, simultaneously
encountering a variety of dissimilarities in national cultures or political systems adds
another level of information-processing demands.
The relationship between information-processing demands and MNEs has been
addressed repeatedly in the international business literature directly or indirectly.
According to the logic of organizational economics, MNEs encounter new and
unfamiliar environments in foreign countries, and they need ownership advantage,
such as superior technological capabilities, to equip themselves to compete with
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indigenous firms (Hymer, 1976). Echoing Hymer’s argument about the costs of doing
business in foreign countries, Zaheer (1995) labels this situation as the liability of
foreignness. In a similar vein, internalization process theory proposes that the
trajectory of foreign market expansion is constrained by the international
environmental complexity (Johnanson & Vahlne, 1977 & 1990). In other words, this
theory predicts the process of international expansion of a firm is an incremental or
step-by-step process, because the firm needs to accumulate knowledge on operating in
foreign countries in order to make its resource commitment without bearing high risk
and uncertainty.
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIROMENT AND COMPLEXITY
In international settings, the importance of national institutions has been
recognized by international business research (e.g., Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 2008).
These institutional environments are critical because they constrain and shape the
interactions among economic agents (North, 1990). North (1990) thus called them the
‘rules of the game’. Additionally, countries vary in terms of their institutional
arrangements and for an MNE operating in various countries, different strategies are
required to be able to adapt or meet the needs of local institutions (Scott, 1995). For
instance, studies investigating the entry mode have found that similarities between
home and host countries, not only in terms of political institutions but also national
cultures, are important for the choice of international entry mode (Kogut & Singh,
1988; Delios & Henisz, 2000). MNEs concurrently operating in varieties of
institutional dissimilarities between the home and host countries may use an array of
entry modes. Consequently, complexity results from managing these various forms of
entries. When considering MNEs facing various institutional environments, Kostova
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and Zaheer (1999) also argue that creating and maintaining organizational legitimacy
is a challenging task for MNEs.
INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITY AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
In line with the information-processing view of the MNE (Egelhoff, 1991) and
research on institutions in international business (e.g., Kostova, 1999), this study
examines the impacts of institutional complexity, TMT turnover, and TMT size on
firm performance. On the one hand, greater MNE’s institutional complexity leads to
greater learned knowledge as well as information-processing demands and,
consequently, may have both positive and negative impacts on firm performance. On
the other hand, lower TMT turnover and larger TMT size can mitigate the negative
effects and enhance an MNE’s managerial IPCs that are critical for coping with
MNE’s institutional complexity.

Therefore, this study proposes that the linkage

between institutional complexity and firm performance is moderated by TMT
turnover and TMT size.
Although the critical role of information-processing demands deriving from
institutional complexity has been identified, the performance implications of
institutional complexity are inconclusive (Goerzen & Beamish, 2003; Zahra, Ireland,
& Hitt, 2000). On the benefits’ side of institutional complexity, being immersed in a
variety of institutional environments assist the MNEs to access various sources of
knowledge in foreign countries. This lens of institutional complexity is based on the
organizational learning perspective (Huber 1991; Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Lane, Salk,
& Lyles, 2001; Levitt & March, 1988). Learning from idiosyncratic institutional
environments can assist MNEs to accumulate knowledge and build their competitive
advantages (Barney, 1991; Grant, 1996) as well as increase their survival chances
(Mohrman & Von Glinow, 1990). Moreover, the acquired knowledge can assist
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MNEs to not only exploit their existing capabilities but also create and explore new
capabilities. Zahra et al. (2000) also found that operating in diverse international
environments leads to greater knowledge breadth and depth and consequently is
associated with superior performance and greater organizational growth.
Operating in dispersed institutional environments may also pose threats for
MNEs. When MNEs enter into countries that are institutionally distant, there will be
only a negligible overlap with the existing knowledge and, as Cohen and Levinthal
(1990) point out, firms learn from their local experience only if the new knowledge
overlaps with or is related to their existing knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).
Similarly, Barkema and Drogendijk (2007) argue that some overlap between the
company’s knowledge base and the knowledge required for operating in the new
cultural bloc is needed for the company to be able to interpret the local experience,
assimilate it, and put it to commercial ends. When an MNE faces similar institutional
environments, the MNE can improve and refine their existing knowledge (Barkema &
Drogendijk, 2007) which leads to semi-automatic reproduction of their existing
routines (Zollo & Winter, 2002; Ahuja & Lampert, 2001), and to the application of
existing concepts and objects, rather than to the development of new ones (Cohen &
Levinthal, 1990). However, greater institutional complexity means that established
competencies cannot be directly applied. Consequently, either internal costs, which
translate existing capabilities or develop new capabilities for local needs, or external
costs, which result from the lack of fit between the MNE’s global standard and local
expectations, occur (Westney, 1993). Goerzen and Beamish (2003) indeed found a
negative relationship between diversified institutional environments faced by MNEs
and MNE performance.
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Within the research on institutions and MNEs, political institutions and culture
in particular have drawn a lot of attention and their role has been largely documented
(e.g., Delios & Henisz, 2003; Kogut& Singh, 1988; Meyer, et al., 2011). In line with
previous research, this study proposes that political and cultural institutions are two
key dimensions of institutional complexity. The impacts or constraints of political
institutions, formal institutions, on MNEs have been widely discussed (Boddewyn,
1988; Delios & Henisz, 2003; Henisz, 2000). For instance, Henisz and Williamson
(1999) demonstrated that in the context of a domestic market the choice to have joint
venture partners is determined purely by a contractual hazard consideration which is
based on transaction cost economics. However, in the context of international markets
contractual and political hazards need to be jointly considered, when the strategic
decisions on international entry mode choices are made. Additionally, the impact of
political hazards on contractual hazards should be considered (Henisz, 2000).
The presence of checks and balances in a host country reduces the likelihood
for an MNE to be exploited opportunistically by the host government. On the other
side, the MNEs can adjust their entry mode strategies or develop other mechanisms to
deal with the risk of expropriation. However, the skills and routines developed in
dealing with a host government are highly idiosyncratic and hard to transfer to
another country if the countries differ substantially in terms of their political
constraints profiles. An MNE operating in different countries and exposed to a variety
of political institutions bears a greater adjustment costs in order to meet local needs.
However, MNEs can benefit from accumulating information and knowledge on
handling a variety of institutional environments and accessing knowledge and
resources embedded in the diversified political institutions. Since political complexity
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of a firm has both positive and negative impacts on firm performance, a pair of
hypotheses is proposed:
Hypothesis 1a: A firm’s political complexity will be positively associated with
firm performance.
Hypothesis 1b: A firm’s political complexity will be negatively associated with
firm performance.
MNEs operating in multiple countries face various national cultures. These
national cultural institutions, or informal institutions, are also critical for MNEs
operating in a variety of societal value systems (Hofstede, 1984; House, 2004). Past
research has documented that not only conflicts (Von Glinow, Shapiro, & Brett, 2004)
but also difficulties in transferring knowledge (Kogut & Singh, 1988) will occur when
larger cultural differences are presented. Consequently, we can expect that an MNE
simultaneously operating in various societal value systems will be challenged by these
difficulties.

A firm’s cultural complexity also increases extra costs, such as

coordinating or communication costs, and information-processing demands at the
headquarters. However, firms can learn from operating in a broad array of national
cultures and thus build better capabilities to service the local needs (Bartlett & &
Ghoshal. 1989). Thus, since there are pros and cons on operating in a variety of
national cultural environments, another pair of hypotheses is suggested:
Hypothesis 2a: A firm’s cultural complexity will be positively associated with
firm performance.
Hypothesis 2b: A firm’s cultural complexity will be negatively associated with
firm performance.
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TMT, INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITY, AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
Although the assumption of classic economics states that economic actors are
rational and possess perfect information, firms or their executives have been
frequently viewed as actors with bounded rationality (Williamson, 1975; Jenson &
Meckling, 1976). Consequently, managerial IPCs are critical for firms. The TMT of a
firm is the “dominant coalition” of individuals in charge of the strategic decisionmaking of firms (e.g. Cyert & March, 1963). Identifying environmental opportunities
and threats, organizational strengths and constraints, as well as related information,
TMTs formulate and implement strategic choices (Child, 1972). This stream of
research emphasizes the importance of top management on strategic decision-making
(e.g., Andrews, 1971; Child, 1972). Thus, the IPCs of top management could affect
strategic behaviors of MNEs, because these capabilities will determine or constrain
the amount of information needed for decision-making as well as the spectrum of
strategic choices.
The focus of upper echelons theory is on the cognitive operation of top
managers. A TMT receives potential stimuli from inside and outside of firms through
the cognitive bases of the members within the TMT. Taking a sequential view
Hambrick and Mason (1984) posited a sequentially perceptual process that forms and
limits the perception of a TMT regarding particular strategic choices. Following
March and Simon’s (1958) argument, the upper echelons theory proposed that
decision makers of a TMT exert their cognitive base to make strategic decisions. This
cognitive base of a TMT is built by the knowledge of the objects, the knowledge of
alternatives, and the knowledge of consequences associated with alternatives. Since it
is difficult for a TMT to possess perfect knowledge, the knowledge of a TMT tends to
be constrained by its cognitive base. Thus, the cognitive base of a TMT will reflect
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the information processing capabilities of the TMT including its capabilities to gather
and process information and to generate the number and variety of alternatives.
From the IPCs aspect, TMT turnover and TMT size are two important
dimensions of TMT composition, (Haleblian & Finkestein, 1993; Sanders &
Carpenter, 1998; Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1996; Virany, Tushman, & Romanelli, 1992;
Wiersema & Bantel, 1993). TMT turnover is critical but prior research largely views
it as a mechanism of adaptation to better handle a turbulent environment (Wiersema
& Bantel, 1993). This line of research neglects that a higher TMT turnover may
curtail the abilities of TMT members to build and accumulate greater knowledge over
time, and thus hamper the IPCs of a firm to deal with a complex environment faced
by the firm. On the other hand, TMT size is associated with the extent of IPCs of the
TMT (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993). For example, a greater extent of international
diversification demands a greater size of TMT (Sanders & Carpenter, 1998).
Consequently, TMT size is positively associated with MNE performance (Carpenter,
Sanders, & Gregersen, 2001). In the following, this study thus proposes that TMT
turnover and TMT size can reflect managerial IPCs of MNEs.
In addition to examining the impact of institutional complexity on firm
performance, this study further focuses on the interaction effects between institutional
complexity, TMT turnover, and TMT size, based on a strategic contingency aspect
(Harrigan, 1983; Venkatraman, 1989). In other words, firm performance is jointly
determined by the interactions of the institutional complexity, reflecting external
information-processing demands, and TMT turnover as well as TMT size,
representing internal managerial IPCs. The strategic contingency perspective has
been largely used to explore the impact of interaction between top executives and
external environments on organizational performance (Haleblian& Finkelstein, 1993;
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Karaevli, 2007). The theoretical argument in this study is that the fit between the
information-processing demands, which are triggered by intuitional complexity, and
managerial IPCs can lead to superior firm performance. However, in the unmatched
situations, this interaction is associated with inferior firm performance. Below, this
study hypothesizes the impacts of interactions between institutional complexity, TMT
turnover, and TMT size on firm performance.
Information-Processing Capabilities and TMT Turnover
Although a firm may benefit from a higher TMT turnover in the circumstance
which existing repertoires need to be replaced by new ones (Tushman & Rosenkopf,
1996; Virany et al., 1992; Wiersema & Bantel, 1993), the benefits may not be
exercised in MNEs which require TMT members to build and accumulate greater
knowledge over time in order to better apply existing repertoires into a variety of
institutional environments. According to human capital theory (Becker, 1964), top
executives accumulate firm-specific human capital embodied in their firms. The
changes of top executives result in losing human capital, and then firm-specific
human capital accumulations at the top of a firm are depleted. Although firms can
recruit new top executives to replace these vacant positions, new executives need time
to acquire and accumulate firm-specific knowledge. Thus, new executives’
performance may not be as good as experienced executives that are retained in firms.
Thus, a higher TMT turnover may have negative impacts on managerial IPCs.
Additionally, greater TMT turnover erodes managerial IPCs not only by
depleting managerial firm-specific knowledge but also by losing the social structure
and fabric of an organization (Dess & Shaw, 2001). In such cases, the loss of key
network members can have serious damages in an organization’s social fabric and
even erode its social capital all together (Leana & Van Buren, 1999). Particularly,
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turnover among executives who occupy central network positions could be more
damaging to managerial IPCs than turnover among executives who occupy less
central network positions. Thus, from the social capital perspective, greater TMT
turnover may lead to inferior managerial IPCs.
A Firm’s Institutional Complexity and TMT turnover
Operating in diversified institutional environments has several potential benefits
(Zahra et al, 2000). These benefits include that learned experience or knowledge in an
institutional environment can be modified and transferred into other settings (Levitt &
March, 1988). Additionally, firms can benefit from leveraging resources in foreign
countries simultaneously when the firms operate in multiple countries (Dunning,
1997). The breadth and depth of organizational knowledge can also be escalated,
when a firm is immersed in multiple institutional environments (Zahra et al, 2000).
The potential advantages for operating in a variety of institutional environments are
the ability to exploit firms’ existing resources and capabilities as well as the
opportunity to explore new resources and capabilities (Dunning & Lundan, 2008).
Consequently, institutional complexity may not only assist a firm’s survival
(Mohrman & Von Glinow, 1990) but also create its competitive advantages (Barney,
1991).
To fully acquire these potential benefits, firms demand a greater extent of
managerial IPCs. The situation of managing institutional complexity differs from a
firm facing dynamic or turbulent environments in which the firm needs to renew or
reset its knowledge and capabilities. When environmental turbulence occurs, the firm
may benefit from having larger TMT turnover which gains more new managerial
knowledge and abilities by bringing in new executives from the external (Virany et
al., 1992). Rather, facing institutional complexity, it is needed to develop dynamic
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capabilities (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997) or absorptive capability (Cohen and
Levinthal, 1990; Zahra and George, 2002) which is based on path-dependence.
Furthermore, the managerial capabilities to effectively manage the repeated exercise
of routines are emphasized. In other words, when encountering the situation of
institutional complexity, the managerial capabilities to retain knowledge from path
dependence become critical. Greater TMT turnover may lose a firm’s accumulated
knowledge from path dependence and weaken its managerial capabilities to manage
this knowledge. Consequently, this study expects:
Hypothesis 3: TMT turnover moderates the relationship between political
complexity and firm performance in such a way that effects are more positive in
the contexts of a lower TMT turnover.
Hypothesis 4: TMT turnover moderates the relationship between cultural
complexity and firm performance in such a way that effects are more positive in
the contexts of a lower TMT turnover.
Information-Processing Capabilities and TMT Size
In addition to TMT turnover, TMT size is related to the use of information by
the team. As the number of members in a TMT increases, more differentiation in
perspective (Dearborn & Simon, 1958) and specialization of skills and diversity of
opinion (Bales & Borgatta, 1955) are expected. Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992: 1449)
noted that “the resources available on a team result from how many people are on it.”
Based on the argument that information is a kind of resource, it also can be held that a
large TMT can acquire more information, compared to a small one. Furthermore,
Srivastava and Lee (2005: 467) stated “a larger TMT size could also indicate more
extensive inter-firm network of the top management.” In other words, larger
networking derived from greater TMT size may gain more information and thus
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possess better capabilities to predict environmental situations and judge the quality of
potential alternatives. Consequently, large team size has been proposed to possess
better problem-solving capabilities. Compared to a small TMT, a large TMT with
more top executives may also have greater IPCs. Generally, larger teams may tend to
possess more sufficient resources and capabilities for solving team tasks (e.g. Hill,
1982). These superior problem-solving capabilities derive from increasing the amount
and variety of information, critical judgments, alternatives, and perspectives (e.g.
Harrison, 1975).
A Firm’s Institutional Complexity and TMT Size
Although the benefits of more cohesive and harmonious small teams have been
proposed (e.g. Shaw, 1981), these benefits tend to occur in easier tasks (Hare, 1952),
rather than in complex decision-making. As a result, increasing team size may benefit
from increasing problem-solving capabilities. Facing institutional complexity, top
executives demand a larger amount of information to process. Thus, a greater TMT
size reflects larger managerial IPCs for the firm. In other words, in the situation of
institutional complexity, the benefits associated with a greater TMT size is likely to be
fully exercised. Therefore, this study argues:
Hypothesis 5: TMT size moderates the relationship between political complexity
and firm performance in such a way that effects are more positive in the contexts
of a larger TMT size.
Hypothesis 6: TMT size moderates the relationship between cultural complexity
and firm performance in such a way that effects are more positive in the contexts
of a larger TMT size.
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METHODS
Sample and Data Sources
Our sample is based on archival data from 2002 to 2009. To limit the reverse
causality issue, this study lagged the data of the independent and control variables by
one year. Consequently, data on independent and control variables are from 2001 to
2008. We obtained data from the following sources: (a) firm performance and other
industry- and firm-level financial data were collected from the Compustat database;
(b) data on host countries which the foreign subsidiaries of firms are located were
taken from the Directory of Corporate Affiliations (DCA); (c) the TMT data were
acquired from the Compustat ExecuComp database and 10-K; (d) the board
characteristic data from the Corporate Library database; and (d) Henisz’s Political
Constraint Index (POLCON) dataset and Global Project on national cultures were the
data sources for political and cultural institutions, respectively. The initial sample for
the study was the DCA data, which contains information on the foreign subsidiaries of
US firms. Since the purpose of this study is to examine institutional complexity on
firm performance, we kept firms which had a ticker symbol in DCA. Our initial
sample hence included 6,911 observations on 1,836 public firms. Additionally, since
our focus is on institutional complexity, we only include firms with subsidiaries
operating in three or more foreign countries.

Based on this criterion, 3,752

observations were dropped. Since firms with one year observation cannot capture
unobservable time variation, 196 firms with one year observations in the DCA were
deleted. Then, we left 2,963 observations on 635 firms. After merging data from
other sources and dropping observations with missing values, our final sample
contains 301 firms and 1,404 observations.
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Statistical Model
This study used a panel data set so the fixed-effects regression models were
used to test the hypotheses. The fixed-effects regression models as well as randomeffects regression models can be used for analyzing panel data. This study followed
commonly used statistical procedure and ran the Hausman specification test to
determine which models should be used. The results of the Hausman specification
test suggest that the fixed-effects regression models are more suitable for this study.
Therefore, the fixed-effects regression models were selected. Since this study
included interaction terms in the regression models, this study entered standardized
predictors into the regression models in order to reduce the potential issue of
multicolinearity caused by including interactions in the regression models.
Variables
Below the definition and operationalization of variables is introduced. The
summary of variable definition and data sources is in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1 Variable Definition and Data Sources for Essay 3
Variable

Description

Source

Firm performance

ROA = net income/total assets *100

1

Political complexity

Political complexity = coefficient of variation on the
POLCON distance (pccv);

2

Calculation steps:
Step 1: Calculation for 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 =
𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑗 − 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑢𝑠 ); j: a host country which a
foreign subsidiary of an MNE locates

Step 2: pccv = (sd of 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 / mean of
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 )
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Cultural complexity

Cultural complexity = coefficient of variation on the
GLOBAL PROJECT’s cultural distance (cccv);

3

Calculation steps:
Step 1: Calculation for 𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 =
∑9𝑖=1(𝐼𝑖𝑗 − 𝐼𝑖𝑢𝑠 )2 /𝑉𝑖 ) ∗ 1/9; j: a host country; i: a
dimension of culture; V: variance of a cultural
dimension; This measure is similar to Kogut and Singh’s
(1988) indicator of cultural distance

TMT turnover

Step 2: cccv = (sd of 𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 / mean of
𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 )

4

TMT size

The number of changes of top executives/
𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑝 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡−1 *100

A count of the total number of top officers in an MNE

4

Industry ROA =
∑𝑛𝑖�𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒�𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 � ∗ 1/𝑛 *100

1

Chatterjee and Wernerfelt’s measure

5

Industry performance

n: the total number of firms with the same three-digits
SIC codes excluding the focal firm
Product diversification

Product diversification = ∑𝑗 𝑑𝑖ℎ 𝑝𝑖𝑗

𝑑𝑖ℎ : It is a distance of a business segment to the largest
business segment of the MNE based on SIC code; 0 if
they have the same four-digit SIC codes; 1 if they have
the same three-digit SIC code, and ect.

International diversification

𝑝𝑖𝑗 : sales in j business segment/total sales

The number of host countries which an MNE has
subsidiaries located.

6

R&D intensity

R&D spending/total sales * 100

1

Firm size

The total assets of an MNE

1

Board size

The number of directors on a board

7

Outside director ratio

The number of outside directors/the number of total
directors*100

7

TMT average firm tenure

The mean of executives’ firm tenure

4
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TMT average age

The mean of executives’ age

4

TMT firm tenure
heterogeneity

Following Wiersema and Bantel’s (1992) suggestion,
TMT firm tenure heterogeneity was measured by the
coefficient of variation of executives’ firm tenure

4

TMT age heterogeneity

The coefficient of variation of executives’ age

4

Note: 1. Compustat database; 2. Henisz’s Political Constraint Index (POLCON) dataset; 3. House’s
Global Project; 4. Compustat ExecuComp database; 5. Compustat Segment database; 6. Directory of
Corporate Affiliations database; 7. Corporate Library database

Dependent Variable
Firm performance. Return on assets (ROA), an accounting-based performance
measure, is frequently used by prior research (e.g., Virany, et al., 1992). Thus, we
used ROA, the percentage of the net income over total assets, as the indicator of firm
performance in this study. Additionally, return on sales (ROS), the percentage of the
net income over total sales, was used for robustness checks.
Independent and control variables
Firm’s political complexity. Henisz’s political constraints (POLCON) were
employed to capture the political institutions of a nation. The POLCON indicator
measures the extent to which the structure of political institutions affects or constrains
the choice of public policy (Henisz, 2000).

Past research has widely used this

indicator (Delios & Henisz, 2003; Henisz, 2000).

For calculating institutional

complexity, two steps were needed. First, the data on the entire institutional distances
between the U.S. home country and all host countries in which subsidiaries of a firm
are located was needed. Each political distance was measured by the absolute value of
the difference between the U.S.’s and a host country’s scores on the POLCON
indicator. Second, a complex measure needs to be created. Here, MNE’s political
complexity was measured by the coefficient of variation, which is commonly used for
measuring the dispersion of a continuous variable (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). It was
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calculated by the standard deviation of all political distances between the U.S., the
home country of an MNE, and foreign countries, which the subsidiaries of the MNE
are located, over the mean of these distances.
Firm’s cultural complexity. The cultural institutions of a nation were gathered
from the GLOBAL project. House’s (2004) GLOBAL project on national cultures
contains nine national cultural dimensions: assertiveness, institutional collectivism,
in-group collectivism, future orientation, gender egalitarianism, humane orientation,
performance orientation, power distance, and uncertainty avoidance. Since cultural
institutions include nine dimensions, this study used Kogut and Singh’s (1988)
formula to construct a distance index. This formula generates a composite index of
the GLOBAL project’s nine cultural dimensions. The absolute value of the difference
between the U.S.’s and a host country’s scores was used to measure each cultural
distance. Finally, cultural complexity was measured by the coefficient of variation of
an MNE’s cultural distances.
TMT turnover.TMT in this study is defined as the number of top executives
listed on a firm’s annual proxy, DEF14A SEC form, similar to prior research which
use the list of top executives on the filings as the definition of TMT (Carpenter,
Pollock, & Leary, 2003; Gordon et al., 2000). TMT turnover is a ratio measure. It
was calculated by the number of changes of top executives over the total number of
top executives in last year, in line with past research (Virany, et al., 1992).
TMT size. This study used a count of the number of top executives to measure
TMT size, following past research (Carpenter et al., 2001; Hambrick & D’Aveni,
1992; Hoffman, Lheureux, & Lamont, 1997; Simons, Pelled, & Smith, 1999).
Industry profitability. Industry profitability here reflects generally the
profitability of a firm’s competitors in a particular industry. Average industry ROA
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which is the percentage of the industry net income over industry total assets is used to
measure industry performance. The data on an industry are based on firms with the
same three-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) code but exclude the focal
firms.
Product diversification. The spectrum of product portfolio can determine the
profitability of a firm (Palepu, 1985).

Therefore, product diversification was

controlled by this study with product diversification measured using Chatterjee and
Wernerfelt’s entropy measure (1991).
International diversification. Prior research has documented that international
diversification can impact firm performance (e.g., Geringer et al., 1989).
International diversification in this study is measured by the number of foreign
countries in which the firms have subsidiaries located. The measure of international
diversification is in line with prior research (e.g. Geringer et al. 1989).
R&D intensity. Innovation is critical to build a firm’s competitive advantages,
and thus impacts firm performance (e.g., Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997). This study
used R&D intensity to be a proxy for innovation. We measured R&D intensity by the
ratio of R&D spending over total sales.
Firm size. Firm size is widely accepted to influence the MNE performance
(e.g., Hitt et al., 1997). Thus, total assets of a firm are used to measure firm size and
are controlled by this study.
Board size. Board size is one of the important corporate governance variables.
It was calculated by the number of directors on a board.
Outside director ratio. Outside director ratio can reflect the extent of board
vigilance and thus impact firm performance. The outside director ratio was measured
by the number of outside directors over the total number of directors.
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TMT average firm tenure. The mean of executives’ firm tenure was used to
measure TMT average firm tenure.
TMT average age. TMT average age was calculated by the mean of executives’
age.
TMT firm tenure heterogeneity.

It represents the shared common firm

experiences. Following Wiersema and Bantel’s (1992) suggestion, TMT firm tenure
heterogeneity was measured by the coefficient of variation of executives’ firm tenure
which is calculated by the standard deviation of the TMT’s firm tenure over its mean.
TMT age heterogeneity. Similar to the calculation of TMT firm tenure
heterogeneity, the coefficient of variation of executives’ age is used to measure TMT
age heterogeneity.
RESULTS
Table 4.2 presents means, standard deviations, and Table 4.3 demonstrates
correlations for all variables. We report the results of the fixed-effects regression
analyses for firm performance in Table 4.4. In Table 4.4, Model 1 is the baseline
model where only control variables are included. The model is significant (F = 4.01; p
<.001). Five control variables: industry profitability, R&D intensity, outside director
ratio, TMT firm tenure heterogeneity, and TMT age heterogeneity, are significant in
Model 1.

In the baseline model, interestingly, we found that neither product

diversification nor international diversification has a significant effect on firm
performance. These results may once again document that the effects of product
diversification or international diversification on firm performance are more
complicated than a linear relationship.
In the baseline model, we found that industry profitability is positively
associated with firm performance (b = 1.774, p <.001) in the baseline model. It
95

indicates that firm performance will increase 1.774 units when industry profitability
increases 1 unit. Additionally, in the baseline model, we found that R&D intensity
has a negative impact on firm performance, the coefficient of R&D intensity (b = 1.612, p <.10), which is in congruence with prior findings (Bouquet, Morrison, &
Birkinshaw, 2009; Lu & Beamish, 2004). Furthermore, the baseline model showed
that outside director ratio, TMT firm tenure heterogeneity, and TMT age
heterogeneity have negative impacts on firm performance (b = -1.289, p <.05; b = 1.612, p <.01; b = -1.266, p <.10, respectively).
Models 2 and 3 add two predictors, separately. Additionally, Model 4 to 7 add
the interaction between political complexity and TMT turnover, the interaction
between cultural complexity and TMT turnover, the interaction between political
complexity and TMT size, and the interaction between cultural complexity and TMT
size, respectively. Finally, Model 8 presents the full model. Models 2 to 8 are all
significant (F = 3.74, P < .001; F = 3.76, P < .001; F =4.64, P < .001; F = 3.81, P <
.001; F = 4.09, P < .001; F = 3.77, P < .001; F = 6.01, P < .001).
Although this study does not hypothesize the impacts of TMT turnover and
TMT size on firm performance, we can observe these relationships through our
Models. In the full model, Model 8, we did not find any relationship between TMT
turnover and firm performance, because the coefficient for the TMT turnover is
insignificant in Model 8 (b = .517, p>.01). However, the full model showed that
TMT size negatively impacts firm performance (b = -.880, p<.10). This result may
contradict the predictions in most prior research, but Certo, Lester, Dalton, and Dalton
(2006) did not find a consistent association between TMT size and organizational
performance in their meta-analysis.
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Since a firm’s political complexity has positive as well as negative impacts on
firm performance, a pair of hypotheses is proposed in hypotheses 1a and 1b. However,
the coefficients for the political complexity are insignificant in Model 2 (b = .686, p
>.10) as well as Model 8 (b = .212, p >.10). Thus, neither Hypothesis 1a nor
Hypothesis 1b is supported.

Similarly, another pair of hypotheses proposed in

Hypothesis 2a and Hypothesis 2b to examine the relationship between a firm’s
cultural complexity and firm performance. The coefficient for the cultural complexity
is insignificant in Model 3 (b = -1.094, p>.10) but significant in Model 8 (b = -1.809,
p<.10). Consequently, Hypothesis 2b rather than Hypothesis 2a receives a marginal
support.
In Hypothesis3, we propose that TMT turnover moderates the relationship
between political complexity and firm performance in such a way that effects are
more positive in the contexts of a lower TMT turnover. This hypothesis is supported
in both Model 4 (b = -1.527, p <.001) and Model 8 (b = -2.159, p <.001). Figure 4.1
shows this graph. Similarly, Hypothesis 4 argues that TMT turnover moderates the
relationship between cultural complexity and firm performance in such a way that
effects are more positive in the contexts of a lower TMT turnover. The coefficients
for the interaction between a firm’s cultural complexity and TMT turnover are
significant in Model 5 (b = -1.014, p <.01) and Model 8 (b = -1.342, p <.001).
Therefore, Hypothesis 4 is supported. Figure 4.2 demonstrates the graph.
Hypothesis 5 suggests that TMT size moderates the relationship between
political complexity and firm performance in such a way that effects are more positive
in the contexts of a larger TMT size. The coefficients for the interaction between a
firm’s political complexity and TMT size are significant in Model 6 (b = 1.360, p
<.01) and Model 8 (b = 2.239, p <.001).
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Consequently, the results show that

Hypothesis 5 is supported. Figure 4.3 presents the graph. In Hypothesis 6, we expect
that TMT size moderates the relationship between cultural complexity and firm
performance in such a way that effects are more positive in the contexts of a larger
TMT size. The results also support Hypothesis 6, because the coefficients for the
interaction between a firm’s cultural complexity and TMT size are significant in
Model 7 (b = .947, p <.01) and Model 8 (b = 1.212, p <.01). Figure 4.4 shows the
graph.
Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics for Essay 3
Variables
1

Firm performance
Industry
2
Profitability
Product
3
diversification
International
4
diversification
5
R&D intensity
6
Firm size
7
Board size
Outside director
8
ratio
TMT average firm
9
tenure
10
TMT average age
TMT firm tenure
11
heterogeneity
TMT age
12
heterogeneity
13
TMT turnover
14
TMT size
15
Political complexity
16
Cultural complexity
Note: N=1404

SD

Mean
4.49

13.69

3.91

7.12

0.44

0.64

11.47

10.64

7.91
14.95
9.34

8.95
98.34
2.29

74.11

14.05

7.95

4.38

51.99

3.98

0.71

0.32

0.12

0.05

18.93
5.88
0.97
0.56

17.82
1.18
0.39
0.19
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Table 4.3 Correlations for Essay 3
Variables

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Firm performance
1.00
Industry
2
0.17
1.00
Profitability
Product
3
0.02 -0.01
1.00
diversification
International
4
0.11
0.08
0.18
1.00
diversification
5
R&D intensity
-0.17 -0.03 -0.26
0.09
1.00
-0.01 -0.02
0.06
0.09 -0.05
1.00
6
Firm size
0.10
0.11
0.22
0.29 -0.16
0.22
1.00
7
Board size
Outside director
8
-0.02
0.00
0.11
0.16 -0.03
0.01
0.16
1.00
ratio
TMT average firm
9
0.07
0.00
0.06
0.03 -0.05 -0.02
0.15 -0.21
1.00
tenure
10 TMT average age
0.02
0.07
0.15
0.10 -0.13
0.06
0.17 -0.08
0.37
TMT firm tenure
11
-0.06 -0.02
0.03
0.16
0.03
0.09
0.18 -0.03
0.09
heterogeneity
TMT age
12
-0.08 -0.12 -0.11 -0.17
0.07
0.02 -0.14 -0.20
0.08
heterogeneity
13 TMT turnover
-0.07
0.03 -0.02
0.05
0.09
0.11
0.03
0.01 -0.12
-0.13 -0.14
0.02
0.06
0.03
0.13
0.13
0.06 -0.19
14 TMT size
0.04
0.06
0.05
0.23 -0.09
0.02
0.12
0.04 -0.03
15 Political complexity
0.10 -0.03
0.05 -0.11 -0.13
0.01
0.04 -0.08
0.03
16 Cultural complexity
Note: N=1404; All correlations larger than .05 in absolute value are significant at the p=.05 level.

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

1.00
0.34
0.04
-0.01

1.00
0.01
0.03

1.00
-0.03

1.00

1
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1.00
0.12

1.00

0.03

0.09

1.00

0.03
-0.07
0.03
0.05

0.13
0.29
0.08
0.00

0.02
0.14
0.01
-0.06

Table 4.4

Results of Fixed-effects Linear Regression Analyses for ROA

Variables
Constant
Industry Profitability
Product diversification
Internationalization
R&D intensity
Firm size
Board size
Outside director ratio
TMT average firm tenure
TMT average age
TMT firm tenure
heterogeneity
TMT age heterogeneity

Model 1
4.492***
[0.309]
1.774***
[0.401]
0.902
[1.071]
-0.823
[1.199]
-1.612†
[0.960]
-3.690
[2.986]
-1.178
[0.867]
-1.289*
[0.602]
-0.443
[0.979]
-0.355
[0.885]
-1.612**
[0.584]
-1.266†
[0.648]

Model 2
4.492***
[0.309]
1.743***
[0.402]
0.904
[1.071]
-0.955
[1.209]
-1.598†
[0.960]
-3.859
[2.992]
-1.240
[0.870]
-1.278*
[0.602]
-0.444
[0.979]
-0.357
[0.885]
-1.633**
[0.584]
-1.296†
[0.649]

Model 3
4.492***
[0.309]
1.781***
[0.401]
0.871
[1.071]
-1.028
[1.217]
-1.638†
[0.960]
-3.771
[2.987]
-1.334
[0.881]
-1.282*
[0.602]
-0.361
[0.983]
-0.374
[0.885]
-1.606**
[0.584]
-1.244†
[0.649]

TMT turnover
TMT size

0.686
[0.784]

Political complexity
Cultural complexity
Political complexity * TMT
turnover
Cultural complexity * TMT
turnover
Political complexity * TMT
size
Cultural complexity * TMT
size
No. of firms
No. of observations
F value

301
1404
4.01***

301
1404
3.74***

100

-1.094
[1.114]

301
1404
3.76***

Model 4
4.551***
[0.307]
1.736***
[0.399]
0.953
[1.063]
-1.009
[1.200]
-1.577†
[0.952]
-3.382
[2.972]
-1.183
[0.863]
-1.276*
[0.598]
-0.551
[0.972]
-0.446
[0.887]
-1.725**
[0.582]
-1.288*
[0.645]
0.259
[0.370]
0.362
[0.782]
-1.527***
[0.350]

301
1404
4.64***

Table 4.4 Results of Fixed-effects Linear Regression Analyses for ROA (cont.)
Model 8
4.486***
Constant
[0.302]
1.453***
Industry Profitability
[0.397]
1.125
Product diversification
[1.045]
-1.415
Internationalization
[1.198]
-1.267
R&D intensity
[0.943]
-2.849
Firm size
[2.925]
-1.180
Board size
[0.864]
-1.318*
Outside director ratio
[0.587]
-0.633
TMT average firm tenure
[0.969]
-0.523
TMT average age
[0.871]
TMT firm tenure
-1.476*
heterogeneity
[0.605]
-0.852
TMT age heterogeneity
[0.643]
0.517
TMT turnover
[0.393]
-0.719
-0.744
-0.880†
TMT size
[0.481]
[0.481]
[0.508]
0.688
0.212
Political complexity
[0.782]
[0.770]
-1.208
-1.202
-1.809†
Cultural complexity
[1.114]
[1.113]
[1.094]
Political complexity * TMT
-2.159***
turnover
[0.371]
Cultural complexity * TMT
-1.014**
-1.342***
turnover
[0.366]
[0.384]
Political complexity * TMT
1.360**
2.239***
size
[0.438]
[0.465]
Cultural complexity * TMT
0.947**
1.212**
size
[0.421]
[0.443]
No. of firms
301
301
301
301
No. of observations
1404
1404
1404
1404
F value
3.81***
4.09***
3.77***
6.01***
Notes: 1. S.E. in square brackets. 2. *** p< 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.10; t test are all twotailed tests.
Variables

Model 5
4.477***
[0.309]
1.767***
[0.400]
0.918
[1.069]
-1.026
[1.215]
-1.730†
[0.958]
-3.532
[2.982]
-1.404
[0.880]
-1.284*
[0.600]
-0.352
[0.980]
-0.423
[0.892]
-1.601**
[0.584]
-1.137†
[0.650]
0.184
[0.373]

Model 6
4.472***
[0.308]
1.554***
[0.405]
0.907
[1.066]
-1.096
[1.204]
-1.484
[0.958]
-3.954
[2.980]
-1.112
[0.867]
-1.298*
[0.600]
-0.639
[0.985]
-0.322
[0.882]
-1.386*
[0.617]
-1.051
[0.656]
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Model 7
4.462***
[0.309]
1.713***
[0.403]
0.999
[1.070]
-1.017
[1.215]
-1.294
[0.966]
-3.756
[2.982]
-1.191
[0.881]
-1.346*
[0.601]
-0.524
[0.991]
-0.311
[0.884]
-1.309*
[0.617]
-1.154†
[0.656]

Figure 4.1 Relationship between Firm Performance and Political Complexity at
Different TMT Turnover Levels
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Figure 4.2 Relationship between Firm Performance and Cultural Complexity at
Different TMT Turnover Levels
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Figure 4.3 Relationship between Firm Performance and Political Complexity at
Different TMT Size Levels
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Figure 4.4 Relationship between Firm Performance and Cultural Complexity at
Different TMT Size Levels
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Robustness Check
This study uses return on sales (ROS) as the dependent variable for robustness
checks. Correspondently, industry profitability, a control variable, is measured by
average industry ROS based on the three-digit SIC code but exclude the focal firms.
The results of the fixed-effects regression analyses for ROS show in Table 4.5.
Model 9 is as the baseline model. Models 10 and 11 add the predictors individually.
Then, Models 12 to 15 enter the four interaction terms, proposed by this study,
separately. Finally, Model 16 is the full model. Congruent with the results in Table
4.4, in addition to Hypothesis 1a, 1b, 2a, Hypothesis 2b and Hypotheses 3 to 6
proposed by this study are supported in Table 4.5.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Much national research emphasizes the importance of environments on
performance (e.g., Porter, 1980). However, these studies pay little attention to the
impact of international institutional environments on firm performance. This study
proposes that greater firm’s institutional complexity is associated with greater learned
knowledge and needs for information-processing. Thus, it may have positive and
negative impacts on firm performance. On the other hand, TMT turnover and TMT
size in this study are constructed as the capabilities of information-processing.
Consequently, based on a strategic contingency perspective, this study expects that
smaller TMT turnover or greater TMT size acts as a moderator to weaken the negative
impact of institutional complexity on firm performance. Based on a sample with 301
U.S. firms and 1,404 observations, our results support most hypotheses proposed by
this study. These findings once again document the importance of tailoring internal
components with external environments (Prescott, 1986; Vissa & Chacar, 2009).
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Table 4.5 Results of Fixed-effects Linear Regression Analyses for ROS
Variables
Constant
Industry Profitability
Product diversification
Internationalization
R&D intensity
Firm size
Board size
Outside director ratio
TMT average firm tenure
TMT average age
TMT firm tenure
heterogeneity
TMT age heterogeneity

Model 9
4.948***
[0.654]
3.623***
[0.874]
3.282
[2.263]
-1.999
[2.551]
-3.287
[2.030]
-11.310†
[6.320]
-3.128†
[1.836]
-1.445
[1.273]
-1.149
[2.072]
0.923
[1.872]
-2.783*
[1.233]
-2.926*
[1.369]

Model 10
4.948***
[0.654]
3.586***
[0.878]
3.286
[2.264]
-2.135
[2.570]
-3.272
[2.031]
-11.484†
[6.335]
-3.192†
[1.842]
-1.434
[1.274]
-1.152
[2.072]
0.921
[1.873]
-2.806*
[1.235]
-2.958*
[1.371]

Model 11
4.948***
[0.654]
3.635***
[0.874]
3.215
[2.264]
-2.439
[2.589]
-3.342
[2.030]
-11.487†
[6.323]
-3.464†
[1.867]
-1.432
[1.273]
-0.969
[2.079]
0.883
[1.873]
-2.769*
[1.233]
-2.881*
[1.369]

TMT turnover
TMT size

0.734
[1.660]

Political complexity
Cultural complexity
Political complexity * TMT
turnover
Cultural complexity * TMT
turnover
Political complexity * TMT
size
Cultural complexity * TMT
size
No. of firms
No. of observations
F value

301
1404
3.61***

301
1404
3.32***
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-2.356
[2.355]

301
1404
3.39***

Model 12
5.084***
[0.648]
3.535***
[0.870]
3.379
[2.242]
-2.265
[2.545]
-3.217
[2.010]
-10.461†
[6.279]
-3.081†
[1.825]
-1.426
[1.261]
-1.392
[2.053]
0.569
[1.872]
-3.079*
[1.228]
-2.985*
[1.360]
1.059
[0.782]
-0.023
[1.651]
-3.528***
[0.738]

301
1404
4.62***

Table 4.5 Results of Fixed-effects Linear Regression Analyses for ROS (cont.)
Model 16
4.867***
Constant
[0.625]
2.618**
Industry Profitability
[0.849]
4.045†
Product diversification
[2.163]
-3.136
Internationalization
[2.492]
-1.930
R&D intensity
[1.953]
-8.858
Firm size
[6.059]
-2.794
Board size
[1.791]
-1.620
Outside director ratio
[1.215]
-1.890
TMT average firm tenure
[2.008]
0.390
TMT average age
[1.803]
-2.096†
TMT firm tenure heterogeneity
[1.250]
-1.730
TMT age heterogeneity
[1.330]
1.983*
TMT turnover
[0.814]
-2.502*
-2.550*
-3.269**
TMT size
[1.012]
[1.010]
[1.051]
0.713
-0.440
Political complexity
[1.646]
[1.595]
-2.727
-2.817
-4.541*
Cultural complexity
[2.354]
[2.336]
[2.265]
Political complexity * TMT
-5.122***
turnover
[0.768]
Cultural complexity * TMT
-2.329**
-3.593***
turnover
[0.774]
[0.795]
Political complexity * TMT
3.943***
5.914***
size
[0.920]
[0.963]
Cultural complexity * TMT
3.789***
4.549***
size
[0.884]
[0.916]
No. of firms
301
301
301
301
No. of observations
1404
1404
1404
1404
F value
3.67***
4.66***
4.72***
8.50***
Notes: 1. S.E. in square brackets. 2. *** p< 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.10; t test are all twotailed tests.
Variables

Model 13
4.914***
[0.652]
3.603***
[0.871]
3.302
[2.257]
-2.482
[2.580]
-3.546†
[2.024]
-11.039†
[6.305]
-3.666*
[1.861]
-1.431
[1.268]
-0.933
[2.072]
0.615
[1.884]
-2.819*
[1.233]
-2.676†
[1.370]
0.878
[0.788]
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Model 14
4.891***
[0.648]
2.980**
[0.879]
3.334
[2.242]
-2.517
[2.546]
-2.894
[2.014]
-11.721†
[6.272]
-2.757
[1.827]
-1.511
[1.262]
-1.879
[2.074]
1.068
[1.856]
-1.928
[1.295]
-2.135
[1.377]

Model 15
4.830***
[0.648]
3.346***
[0.871]
3.719†
[2.244]
-2.313
[2.564]
-2.032
[2.027]
-11.279†
[6.263]
-2.911
[1.852]
-1.665
[1.261]
-1.519
[2.082]
1.107
[1.856]
-1.763
[1.292]
-2.607†
[1.374]

The directions for future research, at least, have the following three perspectives.
First, employing a national setting, prior research has examined the effects of the
interactions between environments and strategies (e.g., Prescott, 1986) or the interactions
of environments and organizational structures (e.g., Covin & Slevin, 1989) on
performance.

Future research may explore these interactions under international

contexts. Second, this study constructs institutional environments as two dimensions:
political and cultural. However, past research has proposed a variety of other national
institutions, such as economic, financial, administrative, and knowledge-based (Berry,
Guillen, & Zhou, 2010). Thus, a direction of further research may examine the firm
performance implication of the fit between institutional complexity constructed by these
other dimensions and managerial IPCs. Third, this study only proposes TMT turnover
and TMT size as two indicators to reflect the managerial IPCs. Future research may
examine whether other managerial characteristics, such as heterogeneity of TMT
characteristics, TMT education level, or TMT international experience, can reflect the
managerial IPCs, and affect firm performance.
The practical implications have, at least, the following two perspectives. Managers
should be aware that performance implications for institutional complexity are not
isolated from managerial IPCs. In other words, for achieving superior firm performance,
managers should take a firm’s managerial IPCs into considerations, when they determine
their spectrum of international markets or institutional diversity. Additionally, firms
should simultaneously deploy or adjust their portfolio of top executives in order to handle
complex circumstances caused by entering into more foreign markets and consequently
facing more complexity of institutional environments.
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The main contributions of this study at least have the following three implications.
First, it bridges the gap between international business theory and research on
environments and TMTs. It does so by exploring in details the impacts of institutional
complexity, TMT turnover, and TMT size on firm performance. It demonstrates that the
importance of environments and the upper echelons are not only in national settings but
also in international settings. Second, it echoes Verbeke et al’s (2009) call by bringing
the international environmental element, mainly institutional complexity, into the
research of firm performance.

This demonstrates that in addition to traditional

international elements, such as foreign sales over total sales, foreign assets over total
assets, and the number of foreign markets faced by firms (Geringer et al., 1989; Gomes &
Ramaswamy, 1999; Hitt et al., 1997), institutional complexity is another critical element
for firms. Finally, this study contributes to offering a possible answer for inconsistent
findings of the institutional complexity-firm performance association. Zahra et al. (2000)
focus on the benefits of learning from various institutional environments, and suggest that
institutional diversity is positively associated with firm performance. However, Goerzen
and Beamish (2003) emphasize the drawbacks for managing institutional complexity.
Indeed, operating in diversified institutions has its advantages and disadvantages.
Offering a potential answer for inconsistent findings, this study proposes that managerial
IPCs will determine the extent of benefits which the firm can extract from the diversified
institutions an MNE faces.
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